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Tens of millions of people enroll in research studies in the United States every 
year, making human subjects research a multi-billion-dollar industry in the U.S. 
alone. Research carries risks: although many harms are inevitable, some also arise 
from errors or mistreatment by researchers, and the history of research ethics is in 
many ways a history of scandal. Despite regulatory efforts to remedy these abuses, 
injured subjects nonetheless have little recourse to U.S. courts. In the absence of 
tort remedies for research-related injuries, the only venue for resolving such 
disputes is through alternative dispute resolution (ADR)—or more commonly, 
internal dispute resolution (IDR) through a process offered by the research 
institution. The federal regulations on human subjects are silent on resolving 
subject grievances, and to date, little is known about how institutions handle these 
disputes. This Article is the first empirical study of how U.S. universities and 
hospitals resolve subjects’ claims of physical injury, dignitary harm, non-
compensation, deviations from research protocols, and maltreatment by research 
staff. I have conducted in-depth interviews with personnel from 30 hospitals and 
universities to understand how institutions respond to grievances involving 
research subjects. These interviews reveal highly flexible dispute resolution 
processes managed by institutional review boards (IRBs), the institutional 
authorities mandated by federal law to protect human subjects. Although many 
interviewees spoke intuitively of procedural justice—including elements such as 
voice, neutrality, and courtesy—these interviews also indicated problems with 
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neutrality, expertise, representation of participants, one-sided appeals, and access 
to the dispute resolution process itself. This Article takes a close look at current 
practices, and then suggests strategies for improvement, addressing both the 
federal regulations and options for institution-led reforms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Research is an enormous enterprise; more than 19 million individuals 
participate in research studies per year,1 and the annual costs of research in the 
U.S. include an estimated $32 billion in NIH funds2 and over $50 billion in 
pharmaceutical funding alone.3 Although federal regulations, state laws, and 
professional organizations apply countless mandates to institutions that conduct 
human subjects research, the processes for resolving research participants’ 
concerns are a curiously unregulated space. Where grievances arise, U.S. courts 
have recognized claims relating to physical injuries, negligent study design and 
oversight, and insufficiency of informed consent.4 But courts cannot and do not 
respond to most research-related injuries. Litigation is procedurally unavailable for 
large classes of research participants, such as international subjects or subjects in 
intramural federal projects.5 Moreover, many research-related disputes are not 
amenable to courtroom remedies. Recent work suggests that there is a high 
frequency of non-justiciable complaints in healthcare settings,6 and a few such 
concerns in research may include study staff rudeness, offensive recruitment 
efforts, or post-trial access to study drugs. Prior findings suggest widespread 
confusion among subjects about study protocols,7 and this confusion may engender 
other subject complaints. Where litigation is not feasible, or where complaints are 
not cognizable in courts, institutions may seek to provide alternative fora for 
resolving research-related disputes. These ADR practices, however, have gone 
entirely unnoticed by scholarship. 
Responsiveness to research subjects’ injuries and complaints is a legal, 
ethical, and practical imperative for research institutions. At institutions that 
receive federal funds for research, federal regulations governing research with 
                                                 
 1 Adil E. Shamoo, Adverse Events Reporting—The Tip of the Iceberg, 8 ACCOUNTABILITY 
RES. 197, 197 (2001). 
 2 Budget, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget 
[https://perma.cc/2LNT-VL3A]. 
 3 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2015 Biopharmaceutical Research 
Industry Profile 36, http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_phrma_profile.pdf. 
 4 Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research: Informed 
Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229 (2003). 
 5 Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate Injured 
Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 29-30 (2012). 
 6 See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Deconstructing Dispute Classifications: Avoiding the Shadow of 
the Law in Dispute System Design in Healthcare, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (2010). 
 7 Matthew E. Falagas et al., Informed Consent: How Much and What Do Patients Understand?, 
198 AM. J. SURGERY 420 (2009); James Flory & Ezekiel Emanuel, Interventions to Improve Research 
Participants’ Understanding in Informed Consent for Research: A Systematic Review, 292 JAMA 
1593 (2004); Adam Nishimura et al., Improving Understanding in the Research Informed Consent 
Process: A Systematic Review of 54 Interventions Tested in Randomized Control Trials, 14 BMC 
MED. ETHICS 28 (2013). 
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human subjects (the “Common Rule”) delegate oversight over research protocols 
to institutional review boards (IRBs). IRBs are tasked with a priori review and 
approval of research protocols, after determining an appropriate balance of risks 
and benefits, equitable selection of subjects, and reviewing procedures for securing 
informed consent from participants or their legally authorized representatives.8 In 
approving and monitoring protocols, U.S. IRBs often take as their guiding 
principles those set forth in the Belmont Report, a 1979 set of guidelines issued by 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research. Although the Common Rule does not specify the procedures 
that institutions must use when grievances arise during research, federal 
regulations do require that participants receive “an explanation of whom to 
contact . . . in the event of a research-related injury.”9 This implies that responding 
to such contacts is indeed a legal imperative for research institutions, and most 
institutions house that responsibility within the IRB. 
As an ethical matter, the duty to respond to participants’ concerns over the 
course of research follows from the Belmont Report’s emphasis on respect for 
subjects’ autonomy, justice and the equitable selection of study subjects, and 
minimization of research burdens (beneficence and non-maleficence).10 Because 
unforeseen problems may arise during research studies, each of these ethical goals 
requires that when participants allege injuries or grievances, institutions 
responsible for conducting research must remain responsive to these ongoing 
problems. Several scholars have noted that “researcher ethnocentrism” can limit 
researchers’ ability to identify ethical problems in their own protocols, and 
researchers sitting on IRBs may be no different;11 providing a feedback loop for 
subject complaints is an essential means of augmenting IRB review and oversight. 
As a practical matter, providing a forum for the resolution of research-related 
complaints may avert litigation, identify unforeseen problems in research 
protocols, promote stable relationships between research institutions and 
communities who may participate in research, and encourage participation among 
subjects who may be concerned about accountability in the event of injury. 
Prior literature suggests that research institutions do, in fact, maintain internal 
processes for the resolution of research-related disputes, and IRBs provide these 
procedures as part of their research oversight role. But almost nothing is known to 
date about how these processes work. Scholarship on internal dispute resolution 
(IDR) systems—dispute resolution procedures maintained internally by 
corporations or other institutions—reflects concerns about procedural fairness. 
                                                 
 8 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2018). 
 9 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(7) (2018) 
 10 NAT’L COMM’N FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979). 
 11 REBECCA DRESSER, SILENT PARTNERS: HUMAN SUBJECTS AND RESEARCH ETHICS 2 (2017). 
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When one party to a dispute has structured the process by which that dispute is 
resolved, there are many opportunities to build institutional advantage into these 
procedures.12 The need for procedural fairness is keen when parties waive claims 
and other venues, such as an agreement not to sue, or when other venues are 
unavailable from the outset (e.g., because litigation is unavailable, or because the 
complaint is not legally cognizable). IRBs themselves are in a curious role. They 
have a federal mandate to protect subject well-being, independent of the institution, 
and the institution may not authorize research that lacks IRB approval. IRBs do 
not do research themselves, and their practices and decisions are rarely the subject 
of subject complaints. They are thus infrequent “parties” to the disputes. But IRBs 
are nevertheless institutional bodies and composed largely of institutional 
employees and staff, and they are not blind to institutional liabilities. This Article 
will therefore consider IRB-managed processes as “internal” to the institution, 
despite IRBs’ independent grant of authority to approve and oversee human 
subjects research. 
This Article proceeds on the premise that providing procedurally just 
grievance procedures in human subjects research is an entailment of the ethical 
duty to provide resolution to research-related complaints and injuries. Importantly, 
IRBs enact and implement these systems amid long-standing power imbalances 
between researchers, research institutions, and participant communities. The 
history of research abuses worldwide is long, and biomedical research in the U.S. 
has provided some of the most acute examples of studies that violated subjects’ 
rights, autonomy, dignity, and humanity.13 The current regulatory system is 
intended to curb these abuses, bolstered by ethical guidance such as the Belmont 
Report, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Nuremberg Code. But despite these 
regulatory frameworks, power disparities between participants and research 
institutions persist. This is in part a result of epidemiology. The burden of ill health, 
and the risk of ill health, is unevenly distributed along lines of socioeconomic 
status, race, ethnicity, education, disability, and other axes of social 
marginalization.14 Research protocols for the study of disease prevention, etiology, 
progression, and treatment, are therefore likely to recruit and enroll participants 
                                                 
 12 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity 
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 406 (1999); 
Mark Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 13 See, e.g., HARRIET WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID (2014). 
 14 See Paula Braverman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants of Health: It’s Time to 
Consider the Causes of the Causes, 129 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 19 (2014); Sandro Galea et al., Estimated 
Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the United States, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1456 (2011); 
Steven H. Woolf & Paula Braverman, Where Health Disparities Begin: The Role of Social and 
Economic Determinants – and Why Current Policies May Make Matters Worse, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
1852 (2011). 
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with relatively less socioeconomic power—perhaps due to convenience and cost, 
but also as a function of the distribution of disease, as well as the separately 
impoverishing effects of disease. Biomedical research with healthy, compensated 
volunteers may also draw poorer subjects willing to trade off their time, 
convenience, and (sometimes) safety for pay. Multiple studies have shown how 
participants may approach research as a form of employment,15 but compensation 
for research participation is held down to avoid problems of unduly influencing 
poor individuals to take research risks.16 Some have also argued that current 
practices of payment for research participation exploit an “underclass” of healthy 
volunteers compensated to test experimental medications in Phase I trials—the 
first (and riskiest) human tests of new drugs.17 
Given these dynamics, when a dispute arises due to perceived injury or 
misconduct experienced by research participants, research institutions often hold 
a comparative advantage in sophistication, access to human and financial 
resources, and access to the legal system—compared to both participants and 
investigators. Institutions are also repeat players, compared to participants who 
may only take part in one or a few studies, and they may experience a comparative 
advantage due to expertise or relationships strengthened by multiple experiences. 
These comparative disadvantages for research participants present intertwining 
ethical and procedural questions when designing a dispute resolution system. 
Researchers’ interests are also at stake. When resolving disputes between 
participants and investigators, IRBs also have the task of balancing investigators’ 
interests, which may at times diverge from the interests of the institution. For 
example, complaints alleging researcher misconduct, protocol deviations, or 
harassment may expose institutions to liability, but the stakes are high for the 
investigators themselves, who could face termination of their research protocol, 
their entire research program, or their employment. These situations can be 
precarious for subjects, investigators, and research institutions alike, and IRBs 
faced with the management (or even merely the initial intake) of these disputes 
must navigate these conflicts. Although researchers do not have the historic 
structural disadvantage of research participants—they are well-educated and at 
times legally sophisticated parties—researchers’ experience of fair process is 
essential for the long-term function of these dispute resolution programs. 
The goal of this Article is to provide the first description of IDR processes 
                                                 
 15 See, e.g., ROBERTO ABADIE, THE PROFESSIONAL GUINEA PIG: BIG PHARMA AND THE RISKY 
WORLD OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (2010); Carl Elliott & Roberto Abadie, Exploiting a Research 
Underclass in Phase 1 Clinical Trials, 1 N. ENG. J. MED. 2316 (2008). 
 16 See Emily A. Largent and Holly Fernandez Lynch, Paying Research Participants: 
Regulatory Uncertainty, Conceptual Confusion, and a Path Forward, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. 
& ETHICS 61 (2017); William M. Sage, Paying Research Subjects: The U.S. Example, in ESSAIS 
CLINIQUES, QUELLS RISQUES? 137 (A. Laude & D. Tabuteau, eds., 2007). 
 17 ABADIE, supra note 15; Elliott & Abadie, supra note 15. 
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used by research institutions to address injuries and other grievances brought by 
participants in human subjects research. My in-depth interviews with informants 
at federally funded U.S. hospitals and universities have revealed that institutions 
maintain permanent, highly flexible IDR processes in which the IRB manages 
initial complaint intake, complaint investigation, involvement of institutional and 
sometimes external stakeholders, identification of potential remedies, decisions 
that are binding for research protocols, and enforcement of those decisions. These 
processes accommodate not only physical injuries, but also non-justiciable claims 
and concerns brought by people who are not (or not yet) enrolled in research 
protocols. The highly flexible and sometimes unwritten nature of these processes 
allows IRBs substantial discretion in the dispute resolution process, and IRBs use 
this discretion to maximize participation and voice for subjects, investigators, and 
other community stakeholders. Informants often described the goals of their IDR 
systems with reference to Belmont Report principles, including respect for 
autonomy and justice. IRB informants also noted their federal mandate to protect 
research subjects, and discussed research subjects with attention to potential 
vulnerability or disparities in resources and sophistication. This case study 
provides a useful demonstration more generally of how procedural flexibility in 
ADR can serve participation and legitimacy interests for complainants. 
Despite the wide breadth of these IDR systems, however, this study identified 
recurring shortcomings of IDR processes for research-related disputes. This 
Article will consider three shortcomings in particular. First, as a procedural matter, 
the design of these systems uniformly omitted consultation with participants, or 
with non-institutional personnel who could represent participant interests. IRBs 
typically began with informal office practices for handling subject complaints, and 
then codified these practices into more formal systems when pursuing institutional 
accreditation under the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research 
Protection Programs (AAHRPP), which requires a written policy on complaint 
resolution. Design features mitigate the problem of non-consultation: for example, 
built-in procedural flexibility allowed individual subjects some control over the 
process at the time of their complaint, IRB personnel who designed the systems 
might be said to represent participant interests already, and some IRBs involved 
trusted local authorities at the moment when disputes arose. But the lack of 
participant consultation at the time of system design was a missed opportunity to 
establish systems that would be accessible and trusted by participants. 
Second, informants consistently believed that uptake by subjects was low, 
compared to hypothesized rates of injuries and other complaints. There are 
numerous explanations for a lower rate of uptake, including a low frequency of 
grievances, low salience or importance of grievances to research subjects, and high 
effectiveness of initial researcher responses (i.e., before participants decide to 
contact the IRB). But a low rate of uptake may also indicate deficiencies in the 
9
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process. Some informants suggested that participants may be suspicious of IRB-
maintained systems as non-neutral processes, while many suggested that 
participants are unaware that the institution is willing to remedy research-related 
complaints. Based on my study of the available processes, as well as typical 
disclosures and informed consent forms, another possibility is that procedural 
flexibility itself can complicate efforts to make such processes predictable, and to 
make procedural information available in advance. The flexibility for IRBs to 
determine procedures on a case-by-case basis may undermine the predictability 
and legitimacy of the process for prospective claimants (those considering 
complaining), even though the IRB may seek to use that flexibility in ways that 
benefit actual claimants who are using the process. 
Third, these interviews also indicated significant ambiguity regarding the 
capacity of IRBs to undertake dispute resolution, with respect to both neutrality 
and skills. Although these bodies must protect research participants, research-
related disputes systems ask the same personnel to act neutrally toward 
investigators and the institution, which may be concerned about legal exposure, 
public image, and sustainability of relationships with participant communities. 
IRB personnel are also colleagues with ongoing relationships with investigators, 
and informants acknowledged that the stakes of some complaints for investigators 
are high. Sensitivity to investigator interests may account for the common practice 
of allowing investigators to appeal IRB decisions, while participants are not 
generally given notice of an appeal opportunity. In many ways, the use of IRBs to 
resolve research-related disputes is efficient: it takes advantage of existing 
scientific expertise; the federal regulations already give these bodies enforceable 
control over research protocols, which is often needed for durable remedies; and 
IRBs’ central mandate to safeguard participant well-being may provide a much-
needed thumb on the scale in favor of participant interests. But some informants 
in this study noted difficulties in maintaining impartiality in the face of institutional 
pressure and investigator pushback, and IRB personnel often noted their lack of 
training in dispute resolution, mediation, or investigations. Managing research-
related disputes can also tax IRBs’ human resources, especially given the range of 
potential procedures that may be necessary to fully address a complex dispute. 
Based on these findings, this Article offers several recommendations to 
improve the design of IDR systems for resolving research-related complaints. 
Because participants are party to all such disputes, and particularly in light of the 
power disparities between research institutions and participants, institutions should 
involve participants themselves in the initial design or improvement of a dispute 
resolution system. Baseline data on the frequency of participant grievances is 
largely unavailable, particularly for complaints alleging intangible harm, and it is 
difficult to be certain that the low uptake of IDR systems is problematic. But in 
light of preliminary evidence that systems are underutilized, I suggest a greater 
10
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emphasis on dispute resolution systems in the informed consent process, perhaps 
including procedural information and requiring a verbal discussion in addition to 
written informed consent, where practicable. Finally, although it may not be 
necessary to take these procedures out of the IRB, I suggest that institutions may 
consider providing IRB personnel with training in dispute resolution, conflict 
management, or mediation, as well as additional personnel for highly complex 
complaints. Furthermore, it may improve neutrality to provide for independent 
external review of IRBs’ dispute decisions, which may be invoked by the 
participant, investigator, and IRB itself. It may be unwise to establish these as 
federal regulatory requirements, given the advantages of procedural flexibility in 
this context. But research institutions may in fact adopt these practices voluntarily, 
given the ethical and practical advantages of a functioning IDR program. 
This Article proceeds in the following Parts. Part II will situate research-
related disputes in the context of other ADR uses in healthcare settings, and then 
identify the sources of authority, ethical guidance, and regulatory flexibility for 
research institutions to design processes that address participant injuries and 
concerns. Part III presents the empirical study and a process-specific appraisal of 
institutional systems for research-related disputes. This section will note the 
multiple roles of the IRB throughout the IDR process, as well as IRBs’ uses of 
procedural flexibility to serve what they perceive to be participants’ interests. Part 
IV discusses informants’ appraisal of these systems, followed by a more critical 
evaluation of strengths and weaknesses. Part V concludes by considering strategies 
for improving IDR in this context. 
II. IDR FOR RESEARCH-RELATED DISPUTES 
Despite a wide-ranging set of federal regulations, federal laws, state laws, and 
professional requirements governing research with human subjects, there is a 
persistent gap in formal guidance for resolving disputes that arise in human 
subjects research. The federal regulations that govern most research in the United 
States are silent on this issue, as are federal and state laws and aspirational ethical 
guidance governing domestic and global research. This gap in regulation 
corresponds to a near-total absence of knowledge about the processes by which 
research-related injuries and disputes are resolved.18 Most scholarship in this area 
focuses on the problem of financial compensation for physical injuries that arise 
in the course of research.19 Although many such injuries are unavoidable risks of 
                                                 
 18 Kristen Underhill, Legal and Ethical Values in the Resolution of Research-Related Disputes: 
How Can IRBs Respond to Participant Complaints?, 9 J. EMP. RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 71 (2014). 
 19 Carl Elliott, Justice for Injured Research Subjects, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 6 (2012); Michelle 
M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects 
Research, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40 (2003); E. Haavi Morreim, Clinical Trials Litigation: 
Practical Realities as Seen from the Trenches, 12 ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 47 (2005); Pike, supra note 
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clinical research, some have provided a valid basis for litigation, including 
justiciable claims against institutions and individuals who conduct research, IRBs 
and institutional officials who oversee research, research sponsors, and 
manufacturers of products tested in clinical research protocols.20 Institutions may 
seek to settle such claims quickly,21 but the IDR processes that may facilitate 
settlement are entirely unknown. Moreover, even when physical injuries are 
alleged, litigation is unavailable for several categories of claimant and injury, 
making alternative dispute resolution processes the only option for dispute 
resolution.22 
The scholarly focus on physical injuries has also obscured a much wider 
universe of potential grievances by research participants, including claims with 
more precarious footing in U.S. courts. These may include claims of dignitary or 
intangible harm, participant abandonment, inadequate informed consent, negligent 
protocol design, post-research access to drugs or devices, access to incidental 
research findings, or concerns about compensation, or complaints about the lack 
of privacy or confidentiality.23 Where such claims have been unsuccessful in 
litigation, ADR processes are once again the only available forum for dispute 
resolution. The remainder of this Section will consider other uses of ADR in 
healthcare settings, available guidance for IRBs responding to research-related 
complaints, and predictable categories of disputes. 
A. Uses of IDR in Healthcare 
IDR programs are on the rise in healthcare settings, largely inspired by 
changes in the resolution of medical malpractice claims. These systems include 
communication-and-resolution programs for medical errors,24 disclosure and 
apology programs for the proactive disclosure of errors,25 and the use of 
ombudsmen or other internal complaint-handling processes for both justiciable and 
                                                 
5. 
 20 David B. Resnick, Liability for Institutional Review Boards: From Regulation to Litigation, 
25 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (2004); Mello et al., supra note 19. 
 21 Mello et al., supra note 19, at 43. 
 22 Here, I consider ADR to include institutional processes for compensating injuries through 
insurance, if the institution is one of the few that insures against research-related injuries. See Pike, 
supra note 5. 
 23 See infra. Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 941 
(2005) [hereinafter Saver, Medical Research]; Richard S. Saver, At the End of the Clinical Trial: 
Does Access to Investigational Technology End as Well?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 411 (2009) 
[hereinafter Saver, At the End]; Morreim, supra note 19; Underhill, supra note 18. 
 24 William M. Sage et al., How Policy Makers Can Smooth the Way for Communication-and-
Resolution Programs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 11 (2014). 
 25 Maria Pearlmutter, Physician Apologies and General Admissions of Fault: Amending the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 687 (2011); Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for 
Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1224 (2013). 
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non-justiciable complaints in hospital settings.26 Institutions are also 
experimenting with private or court-annexed medical malpractice arbitration.27 
Mandatory arbitration has been particularly controversial in the nursing home 
setting, and as of this writing, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has 
proposed a rule that would loosen requirements needed for nursing homes to 
impose binding arbitration agreements.28 Licensing boards for physicians and 
nurses offer another forum for the resolution of complaints against individual 
providers, including complaints from patients and referrals from other 
authorities.29 Because these are external, rather than IDR programs, however, they 
are less applicable to research-related disputes.) 
IDR is also used outside the context of medical errors and patient complaints. 
Healthcare ethics committees have emerged as a method for managing disputes 
about courses of treatment for patients, reconciling the interests of patients, 
families, and caregivers.30 Bioethics mediation processes, including particularly 
the approach suggested by Nancy Dubler and Carol Liebman, integrates mediation 
skills into clinical ethics consultation, promoting shared decision-making and 
consensus in clinical conflicts.31 Outside clinical care, health insurers offer internal 
procedures for managing coverage disputes, with external review mandated by 
state law (in most states)32 and the Affordable Care Act.33 Some disputes that arise 
                                                 
 26 Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Escaping the Shadow of Malpractice Law, 74 L. & Contemp. Probs. 
241 (2011); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond IDR: Resolving Hospital Disputes and Healing Ailing 
Organizations through ITR, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 173 (2007); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6. 
 27 Matthew Parrott, Is Compulsory Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice Arbitration 
Constitutional?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2007); Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, Analytic 
Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 128 (2009) (reporting Kaiser 
case study). 
 28 82 Fed. Reg. 26649 (June 8, 2017) CMS Issues Proposed Revision Requirements for Long-
Term Care Facilities’ Arbitration Agreements, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (June 5, 
2017), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2017-Fact-Sheet-
items/2017-06-05.html. 
 29 Timothy S. Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look at 
Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309 (1993). 
 30 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The Procedurally 
Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism?, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257 (2009). 
 31 NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO 
SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS (2011). 
 32 Nan Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 93 (2006). 
 33 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148 (2010); Interim Final Rules for 
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and 
External Review Processes under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 FR 43329, July 
23, 2010 (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 54, 26 C.F.R. § 602, 29 C.F.R. § 2590, 45 § C.F.R. 147 (2017)); 
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers: Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and 
External Review Processes 76 F.R. 37207, June 22, 2011, codified at 26 C.F.R. § 54; 29 C.F.R. § 
2590, and 45 C.F.R. § 147 (2017). The ACA mandates external review mechanisms for coverage 
determinations in group health plans and individual plans in the federal and state marketplaces. 
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in healthcare and health research settings are also those of large organizations more 
generally, including concerns about employment and discrimination, interpersonal 
conflicts, shared credit and workload, and organizational concerns. Susan Sturm 
and Howard Gadlin have discussed the National Institutes of Health’s ombudsman 
program for handling these types of disputes, noting the interplay between 
individual-level and systemic analyses and solutions for organizational problems.34 
Aggregating these IDR processes raises questions about healthcare 
exceptionalism:35 whether process values or goals should be differently weighted 
in healthcare settings because there are distinctive interests at stake. Procedural 
scholars have long enumerated the underlying purposes and values of procedural 
due process adjudication, and claims about the values served by process have 
extended from litigation and administrative adjudication to ADR and IDR.36 The 
design of dispute resolution procedures are now widely acknowledged to serve not 
only accuracy, 37 but also other values, particularly given the impossibility of 
perfect accuracy in any system.38 One such value is participation by claimants, 
either because participation is an intrinsic good,39 or because it is instrumental40 in 
producing a psychological experience of fairness,41 promoting dignified 
treatment,42 or conferring legitimacy on decisions.43 Other values may include 
system legitimacy (including “the appearance of fairness”44), predictability,45 
                                                 
 34 Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP. 
RESOLUTION 1, 2 (2007). 
 35 Hunter, supra note 32. 
 36 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (2011); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural 
Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 1 (2011). 
 37 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of 
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004). 
 38 Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic 
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994); Solum, supra note 37, at 185. 
 39 See, e.g., JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177 (1985). 
 40 See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 79 (2015) (describing 
the importance of participation with respect to psychological, dignitary, and legitimacy theories). 
 41 See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 275-80 (2002) (noting 
that “a taste for fairness” may explain individual preferences for some procedures in adjudication, 
but also expressing skepticism that strong preferences exist); see also Lawrence, supra note 40, at 92 
(examining psychological theories that consider the inherent value of participation in dispute 
resolution, including satisfying a preference for fair treatment). 
 42 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 BOS. 
U.L. REV. 885, 886 (1981); MASHAW, supra note 39. 
 43 Solum, supra note 37; accord Lawrence, supra note 40. 
 44 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37. 
 45 Mashaw, supra note 39 at 175-76, also quoted by Redish & Marshall, supra note 37. 
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equality of parties,46 accountability of parties,47 “revelation” and explanation of the 
events that led to the claim,48 and respect for dignity and privacy.49 
Many (although not all) grievances arising in healthcare settings present a 
unique combination of physical or mental vulnerability, information asymmetry, 
emotional weight, socioeconomic disparity, cultural difference, urgency, and 
visceral need, particularly conflicts involving individual patients and healthcare 
providers.50 In this context, process values such as revelation, equality, 
accountability, participation, and dignity take on greater salience; IDR innovations 
such as disclosure-and-apology, communication-and-resolution, and bioethics 
mediation express these values clearly. Because research with human subjects 
presents many of the same contextual features, we may expect similar process 
values to have a high priority in IDR for research-related complaints. 
The legitimacy of not only the IDR process, but also the larger system of 
healthcare services is also an important priority for inherent and instrumental 
reasons. Medical mistrust is a formidable barrier to accessing care51 and promoting 
quality in care delivery52 and perceived mistreatment in medical contexts can foster 
litigation and violence.53 Both undermine the core goals of healthcare institutions, 
many of which are nonprofit corporations principally engaged in patient care. 
Given the goals of institutional legitimacy, such institutions may be more receptive 
to addressing non-justiciable disputes based on interests rather than legal rights.54 
IDR is the only process option for these types of disputes. Many IDR processes in 
healthcare settings were established as alternatives to public adjudication of 
justiciable claims, such as medical malpractice claims sounding in tort or coverage 
disputes sounding in contract. But IDR innovations in health law also extend to 
                                                 
 46 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37, at 484-85; MASHAW, supra note 39 at 171. 
 47 See Galanter, supra note 12. This is particularly problematic for some forms of ADR, such 
as internal dispute resolution, whereby one party designs the procedural rules and provides the forum. 
See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the Haves Hold Court: Speculations on the 
Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941 (1999). 
 48 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational 
Aims in Procedural Due Process, 18 DUE PROCESS: NOMOS 126, 127 (1977)); Hunter, supra note 32. 
 49 Mashaw’s theory considers dignity the overarching underlying value served by equality, 
predictability, participation, and privacy. MASHAW, supra note 39, at 172-82. 
 50 Hunter, supra note 32. 
 51 Thomas A. LaVeist, Lydia A. Isaac, & Karen Patricia Williams, Mistrust of Health Care 
Organizations is Associated with Underutilization of Health Services, 44 HEALTH SERVS. REV. 2093 
(2009); Kristen Underhill et al., A Qualitative Study of Medical Mistrust, Perceived Discrimination, 
and Risk Behavior Disclosure to Clinicians by U.S. Male Sex Workers and Other Men Who Have Sex 
with Men, 92 J. URBAN HEALTH 667 (2014). 
 52 Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 69; see also Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and 
Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613 
(2001). 
 53 Id. at 68, 78. 
 54 Id. 
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disputes that would not support litigation in public courts. Bioethics mediation, 
healthcare ethics committees, internal complaint-handling mechanisms and 
hotlines at hospitals, and fora such as ombudsman programs in large health-related 
organizations all address both justiciable and non-justiciable claims. The 
availability of fora for these disputes promotes not only participation values, but 
also legitimacy of the care system more generally. These themes are all present in 
the context of research-related disputes, to which we now turn. 
B. Authority and Guidance for IDR in Research Settings 
Although the institutions that conduct human subjects research are subject to 
complex and overlapping federal and state laws, as well as informal ethics 
guidance and the requirements of professional self-governance and accreditation, 
the resolution of research-related disputes is an almost entirely unregulated space. 
This Section will describe the authority and existing guidance for research 
institutions addressing participant complaints. 
The regulatory provisions governing research with human subjects include 45 
C.F.R. § 46 (for research at institutions receiving federal funding through most 
agencies and departments) and 21 C.F.R. § 50 and 21 C.F.R. § 56 (for research 
that will be submitted as part of an application for FDA approval of a new drug or 
device). These regulations grant IRBs (which may be internal or external to 
research institutions) the authority to approve and monitor research protocols on 
an ongoing basis. As part of this authority, IRBs are empowered to withdraw 
approval, suspend, or terminate studies.55 This authority entails stoppage or 
modification of a protocol in response to a complaint or injury. Although IRBs 
have authority over research protocols, however, the federal regulations are silent 
on the processes by which participant grievances should be resolved. The Common 
Rule refers to these processes only directly: as part of informed consent, 
participants must receive contact information for a party who can provide “answers 
to pertinent questions about the research and research subjects’ rights, and . . . in 
the event of a research-related injury to the subject.”56 Institutions almost 
universally satisfy this requirement by providing participants with the contact 
information of the IRB, although the regulations do not specify that the IRB is the 
correct or only resource for questions about rights and injuries.57 Dispute resolution 
receives no further attention in the recent revisions to the Common Rule.58 
The Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) within the Department of 
                                                 
 55 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2018). 
 56 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(7) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(7) (2018). 
 57 Underhill, supra note 18. 
 58 Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017). 
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Health and Human Services, which is tasked with enforcing the Common Rule,59 
has issued formal guidance to assist institutions in their oversight of human 
subjects research. These guidance documents, however, address only subject 
concerns that fall into the categories of “adverse events” or “unanticipated problem 
involving risks to subjects or others.”60 Adverse events are narrowly defined as 
“untoward or unfavorable medical occurrence[s] . . . temporarily associated with 
the subject’s participation in the research,” while unexpected problems are 
incidents that are “unexpected . . . related or possibly related to participation in the 
research . . . [and] suggest that the research places subjects or others at a greater 
risk of harm . . . than was previously known or recognized.”61 Even within these 
categories, the focus of OHRP guidance is on how institutions should report the 
events and correct the research protocol—rather than providing mechanisms for 
addressing the harm experienced by the individual subjects. OHRP does not direct 
IRBs to enact a complaint resolution policy separate from these procedures. 62 
Many states also govern human research by statute or regulation, but like the 
federal regulations, these are typically silent on the mechanisms by which 
institutions resolve disputes with individual participants. State statutes governing 
research in California, for example, require that participants in medical research 
receive “the name, address, and phone number of an impartial third party, not 
associated with the experiment, to whom the subject may address complaints about 
the experiment.”63 “Impartial third party,” however, is not defined, nor is the 
procedure by which this third party should resolve the dispute.64 New York state 
law requires that research protocols falling outside federal regulatory requirements 
be reviewed by a “human research review committee”65 and that researchers secure 
informed consent from subjects,66 but does not address the resolution of research-
                                                 
 59 Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional Review 
Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725 (2001). 
 60 45 C.F.R. § 46.108(a)((4)(i) (2018). 
 61 DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, 
Unanticipated Problems Involving Risks & Adverse Events Guidance (2007). 
 62 The self-assessment tool for OHRP’s Quality Assessment Program asks whether the IRB 
operates a “hot line or 800 number for potential or enrolled participants to file complaints or direct 
questions regarding human subjects protection issues,” as well as whether the IRB provides an 
advocacy program or ombudsman for participants, but no additional guidance appears to be available 
in this area. Office for Human Research Protections, QA Self Assessment Tool, 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/education-and-outreach/human-research-protection-program-
fundamentals/ohrp-self-assessment-tool/index.html (Retrieved March 5, 2013). 
 63 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24173(c)(10). 
 64 Research with prisoners may be an exceptional case. California also requires that “provisions 
have been made for compensating research related injury” occurring to prisoners enrolled in research, 
and that the Department of Corrections provide a process for hearing grievances occurring in 
research. Cal. Penal Code § 3515(d), 3518. 
 65 N.Y. Pub. Health § 2444. 
 66 N.Y. Pub. Health § 2442. 
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related complaints. 
Apart from federal and state law, a quasi-binding requirement for institutions 
to address research-related complaints arises from professional accreditation. 
Modern IRBs are often part of broader “human research protection programs” in 
research institutions, which encompass functions such as protocol review and 
approval, research ethics instruction for investigators and research staff, 
development of institutional policies, ensuring compliance of research protocols 
with state law, monitoring conflicts of interest in research, and managing 
unanticipated problems and adverse events. Human research protection programs 
can apply for accreditation by the Association for the Accreditation of Human 
Research Protection Programs (AAHRPP), which has two requirements relevant 
to the management of research-related disputes. First, researchers and staff must 
“have a process to address participants’ concerns, complaints, and requests for 
information.”67 Second, organizations as a whole must “ha[ve] and follo[w] written 
policies and procedures that establish a safe, confidential, and reliable channel for 
current, perspective, or past research participants . . . that permits them to discuss 
problems, concerns, and questions; obtain information; or offer input with an 
informed individual who is unaffiliated with the specific research protocol or 
plan.”68 This duty is not located with the IRB; for example, organizations could 
fulfill the requirements using an ombudsman or research subject advocate. 
AAHRPP has set no requirements for structure of these processes, but simply 
requires that they exist, and implies that they should handle all types of concerns—
including those that are not justiciable in public courts.69 
Aspirational ethics documents provide “soft law” principles that plausibly 
imply that researchers and research institutions have a duty to address the full range 
of participant complaints.70 As noted above, there is a vast array of ethical guidance 
documents in medical research, including the Belmont Report, the Nuremberg 
Code, the CIOMS guidelines, the WMA Declaration of Helsinki, and others. These 
offer additional values that might be relevant to dispute systems design here, but 
no specific procedural guidance. On the basis of the Belmont report, for example, 
the design of a dispute resolution system in this field might seek to promote 
participant autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice defined as 
                                                 
 67 Assoc. for Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs, AAHRPP Accreditation 
Standards, Oct. 1, 2009. 
 68 Id. 
 69 IRB professionals can pursue individual certification through the Certified IRB Professional 
program (CIP) run by the Public Responsible in Medicine & Research (PRIM&R) organization. This 
program, however, does not provide specific training on the management of research-related 
disputes. PRIM&R, CIP Body of Knowledge/Content Outline, 
https://www.primr.org/certification/cip/bodyofknowledge/. 
 70 Underhill, supra note 18. 
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equitable access to the benefits and burdens of research.71 But these broad norms 
leave wide latitude for procedures that attempt to address grievances arising in the 
course of research. 
In some ways, this flexibility is typical of research oversight more generally, 
in which the regulation of research is broadly decentralized and delegated to IRBs 
as what Laura Stark has called “declarative groups—their act of deeming a practice 
acceptable would make it so.”72 The federal regulations do not dictate the outcome 
of any particular protocol, but rather leave these decisions up to IRBs themselves, 
even permitting IRBs to waive informed consent requirements entirely under 
certain conditions.73 IRBs also retain procedural flexibility in the format of their 
deliberations, and institutional practices on IRB membership and deliberation 
vary; variation across IRBs is reinforced by consulting prior decisions within the 
institution as precedent.74 
D. Gaps in Understanding Research-Related Disputes 
Despite near-total freedom for the design of IDR processes in this field, the 
actual dispute resolution practices of research institutions operating in this 
regulatory gap have gone entirely unexamined. Drawing on the literatures above, 
many similar process values will be important for the resolution of disputes in this 
field. These include the values of participation, legitimacy (including legitimacy 
of the process and broader legitimacy of scientific research), predictability for 
potential and actual disputants, equality and accountability in a context where 
research subjects are less powerful than research institutions, revelation for 
subjects interacting with a highly specialized field of knowledge, and dignity and 
privacy interests for all disputants. Moreover, dispute systems for resolving 
research-related disputes likely have similar proximate goals to other ADR 
processes, such as efficiency, durability, and party satisfaction. 
I have previously noted the range of grievances that may arise in human 
subjects research.75 Most previous scholarship in this area has focused on physical 
injuries that are inherent risks of research,76 or that arise from negligence in 
protocol design, approval, or implementation.77 Litigants bringing tort claims 
                                                 
 71 NAT’L COMM’N FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979). 
 72 Laura Stark, Victims in Our Own Minds? IRBs in Myth and Practice, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
777 (2007) [hereinafter Stark, Victims]; LAURA STARK, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: IRBS AND THE 
MAKING OF ETHICAL RESEARCH 164 (2012); Laura Stark & Jeremy A. Greene, Clinical Trials, 
Healthy Controls, and the Birth of the IRB, 375 N. ENG. J. MED. 1013 (2016). 
 73 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(f) (2018). 
 74 Stark, Victims, supra note 72; STARK, supra note 72, at 165. 
 75 Underhill, supra note 18. 
 76 Pike, supra note 5. 
 77 Mello et al., supra note 19. 
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against research institutions have alleged wrongs including negligent protocol 
design or implementation, lack of informed consent, emotional distress, fraud, 
misrepresentation, battery, medical malpractice, products liability claims, privacy 
violations, breach of contract, wrongful death, state law violations, conspiracy, 
participant abandonment, unjust enrichment, and IRB misconduct including 
negligent study approval and oversight.78 Additional claims may include failure to 
disclose individual study results, premature study termination, and withholding or 
denying access to treatments after the study has concluded.79 Complaints made 
outside litigation have included allegations of noncompliance with protocols, 
delayed payments, unwanted requests for study participation, perceived HIPAA 
violations,80 and lack of confidentiality.81 Research on the therapeutic and 
preventive misconceptions suggests that many participants do not fully understand 
protocols at the time of informed consent,82 which can generate complaints later. 
Many of the concerns visible in healthcare settings more generally—such as 
perceived rudeness, long wait times, miscommunications, and other “small-scale 
disputes”83—are almost certainly present in the research context as well. Other 
complaints may have more in common with workplace grievances; many 
participants in non-therapeutic research see their participation as paid work, and 
view study terms as conditions of employment.84 There has been no systematic 
study, however, of how institutions may seek to resolve the universe of participant 
concerns. 
For many if not most of these claims, IDR processes are the only available 
venue for dispute resolution. Litigation is a poor fit for many of these disputes. 
Some of the claims noted above have been rejected by courts (e.g., claims to post-
trial access85) or do not allege legal violations (e.g., unwanted requests for study 
participation). Litigation is also legally or practically unavailable for some 
categories of research subjects. As Elizabeth Pike has pointed out, international 
participants may be barred from recovery due to the Federal Tort Claims Act and 
                                                 
 78 Underhill, supra note 18 (citing additional sources), Mello et al., supra note 19; Saver, At 
the End, supra note 23; Saver, Medical Research, supra note 23; Morreim, supra note 19. 
 79 Gordon 2009, Saver, Medical Research, supra note 23 
 80 HIPAA does not provide for a private right of action, but state courts may rely on HIPAA 
for setting the standard of care in tort actions for privacy violations. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics 
& Gynecology, P.C., 314 CONN. 433 (2014) https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/ 
litigationnews/top_stories/030215-hipaa-disclosure.html. 
 81 Underhill, supra note 18 (citing sources). 
 82 Flory & Emanuel, supra note 8. 
 83 Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6. 
 84 Peter Davidson & Kimberly Page, Research Participation as Work: Comparing the 
Perspectives of Researchers and Economically Marginalized Populations, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1254 (2012). The journal GUINEA PIG ZERO—an “occupational jobzine” for study participants—is 
emblematic of this view. http://www.guineapigzero.com/. See also sources cited infra n. 88. 
 85 Saver, At the End, supra note 23. 
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the Alien Tort Statute,86 and US participants in federally conducted research may 
find their claims precluded due to sovereign immunity and the discretionary 
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Litigation has a number of 
drawbacks in the research context as well, including high costs that may raise the 
costs of research and lead IRBs to make excessively conservative decisions about 
study approval.87 
The literature on research-related disputes sheds little light on IDR options. 
Although some institutions provide no-fault compensation programs for research-
related injuries, such programs are rare,88 and we know little about the processes 
or process values they employ. Several protocols have set up study-specific ADR 
(not necessarily IDR) processes; interestingly, the two published papers on these 
processes are in HIV/AIDS research, reflecting the history of participant advocacy 
and community-based research.89 Both programs resembled arbitration. In one 
program, a series of HIV vaccine trials in India created a three-person arbitration 
board to handle all grievances.90 The other program was an informal arbitration 
system established for a consortium of AIDS treatment trials and was established 
to promote participants’ “right to be treated with dignity”; participants could have 
their complaints represented by a social worker before a study panel, with the 
option to appeal the panel decision to the IRB.91 
Only one published paper has described institutional practices for complaint 
resolution, published by IRB professionals at the Baylor College of Medicine.92 
The Baylor system provides for an “iterative process that seeks to identify the truth 
about research-related complaints through fact-finding efforts.”93 As understood 
by this IRB, due process requires objectivity and the opportunity for all parties “to 
speak to the ‘truth’ as they perceive it.”94 Procedural elements include the 
requirement of a written complaint, IRB classification of the complaint as 
noncompliance or scientific misconduct, notification of a compliance assessment 
team and the principal investigator, a formal audit of study materials and “fact-
                                                 
 86 Pike, supra note 5; see also Sarah Gantz, Judge Dismisses $1 Billion Guatemalan Syphilis 
Experiment Case against Hopkins, Others, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 9, 2016; Estate of Alvarez v. Johns 
Hopkins Univ., 205 F. Supp. 3d 681 (D. Md. 2016). 
 87 Mello et al., supra note 19; Underhill, supra note 18. 
 88 Pike, supra note 5; Elliott, supra note 19. 
 89 Underhill, supra note 18. 
 90 J.L. Excler et al., Preparedness for AIDS Vaccine Trials in India, 127 INDIAN J. MED. RES. 
531 (2008). 
 91 Lisa E. Cox & Thomas M. Kerkering, Grievance Procedures as Assurance for the HIV-
Infected Clinical Trial Participant, 1993 AIDS PATIENT CARE 20 (1993). 
 92 Kathleen J. Motil, Janet Allen, and Allison Taylor, When a Research Subject Calls with a 
Complaint, What Will the Institutional Review Board Do?, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RESEARCH 9 
(2004) 
 93 Id. at 13. 
 94 Id. at 9. 
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finding” through interviewing relevant parties, review of factual findings by an 
IRB subcommittee, a face-to-face “hearing” involving the investigator and IRB 
subcommittee (but not the subject), full IRB deliberation and a preliminary 
decision imposing corrective actions or sanctions on the investigator, an option for 
the investigator to appeal the decision, and a final decision letter by the full IRB 
setting forth factual determinations and a binding corrective action plan. This 
arbitration-like process appears to prioritize accuracy and investigator voice, but 
says little about voice or remedy for the individual participant. 
IDR has structural limitations in this context, particularly when the ADR 
process are maintained by institutions themselves. IRBs who maintain ADR 
processes have divided loyalties to their institutions, their colleagues, and the 
participants they are tasked with protecting, and IRB administrators may be 
concerned about their own liability in the event of litigation.95 Financial incentives 
for researchers and institutions may encourage unethical behavior in both the 
oversight and implementation of research protocols.96 And like all IDR programs, 
this context raises concerns about privatizing legal norms, transmuting rights-
based claims into organizational issues, providing a highly unequal forum, and 
deterring publicly useful litigation.97 But where IDR may be the only practicable 
option for resolving many of these disputes, it is important to interrogate the 
process choices that institutions have already made. 
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IDR FOR RESEARCH-RELATED DISPUTES 
No previous research has examined the role of IDR in the resolution of 
research-related disputes. This Part will introduce the study methods, followed by 
results describing the frequency and nature of complaints, process options, uses of 
procedural flexibility, and informants’ appraisal of their processes. Throughout, I 
will use “informants” to refer to individuals who participated in my interviews, 
and “subjects” or “participants” to refer to individuals who lodge (or may lodge) 
complaints with their IRBs. Where I have quoted informants directly, I have 
selected quotes that are most striking or most typical of responses across the full 
set of informants. 
A. Methods 
The goal of this empirical study was to understand the structure and animating 
procedural values of ADR processes that research institutions use to manage 
                                                 
 95 Mello et al., supra note 19. 
 96 Carl Elliott, The University of Minnesota’s Medical Research Mess, The N.Y. Times, May 
26, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/opinion/the-university-of-minnesotas-medical-
research-mess.html. 
 97 See, e.g., Edelman & Suchman, supra note 47. 
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disputes involving human subjects. This Part presents the result of in-depth, semi-
structured qualitative interviews with human research protections program officers 
at 30 hospitals and academic institutions throughout the US. All procedures were 
approved by the Yale Human Subjects Committee and advised by an expert panel 
of 6 scholars and IRB professionals. Data were protected by a Certificate of 
Confidentiality (COC) from NIH, which aims to facilitate research on sensitive 
topics by shielding individual participant data from subpoena.98 
The population of interest for this study was IRB chairs, directors, and other 
designated IRB personnel who have discretion in responding to complaints; all 
individuals in the study had at least 1 year of experience reviewing human subjects 
protocols and had discretion in managing institutional responses to participant 
complaints. I interviewed one person per institution, with the exception of one 
institution, where I ran a joint interview with two IRB officers. Twenty-six of the 
31 informants were chairs or directors of their IRBs; the others were managers or 
administrative chairs. 
The unit of analysis for this study was the institution; I included IRBs that 
reviewed protocols for a hospital or academic institution, were located in the US 
and subject to US federal regulation, and had an OHRP-approved federal-wide 
assurance number.99 A majority of eligible institutions100 were academic 
institutions that encompassed both medical and nonmedical schools; I 
oversampled hospitals and universities lacking medical schools to ensure adequate 
data from these types of institution. The final sample included 20 universities with 
                                                 
 98 Leslie E. Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting Human Subject Research 
Data in Law and Practice, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 594 (2015). 
 99 Although institutions have procedural freedom to have complaints resolved outside the IRB, 
common practice is for this to be a core IRB function, and I thought IRBs would be aware of dispute 
resolution practices even if they occurred outside the IRB office. 
 100 Because this study was funded through the Fordham HIV Prevention Research Ethics 
Training Institute, a second part of the interviews specifically considered management of disputes 
arising in biomedical HIV prevention research. To fulfill this part of the study, I further limited the 
sample to institutions that had received funding from any source within the previous 5 years to 
conduct social science research or clinical research on biomedical HIV prevention. I identified 
eligible institutions by searching all active protocols in the NIH RePORTER database as of May 
2013, clinicaltrials.gov, and consulting trials networks for biomedical HIV prevention research. One 
hundred and sixteen unique institutions were eligible for inclusion. I used a computer-generated 
random number sequence to select simple random samples of ten institutions at a time for 
recruitment. I approached 73 institutions to secure the sample of 30 included interviews; the other 43 
institutions either did not respond (35) or declined (8) for reasons including busy schedules or lack 
of expertise handling participant complaints. This design introduces some inevitable weaknesses; for 
example, there may be some social desirability in responses, and participating institutions may have 
been more comfortable discussing their procedures—perhaps because they had better-defined 
procedures or fewer negative experiences with research-related disputes. These limitations are 
inherent in most qualitative research designs, but they are balanced in this study by the strength of a 
simple random sampling procedure among eligible studies, full data saturation on all themes of 
interest, and stratification of recruitment across three different types of institution. 
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medical schools, 4 universities without medical schools (where almost all 
protocols were for social and behavioral research), and 6 hospitals.101 Institutions 
were located in all four US Census Bureau regions, and the sizes of their research 
portfolios ranged from 20 to more than 5,000 active protocols enrolling human 
subjects. 
I did not include external or centralized (independent) IRBs; although 
centralized IRBs approve research protocols (and may experience liability for 
negligent approvals), they have different liabilities from institutions who receive 
funds from research sponsors, employ investigators and research staff, and provide 
material support and physical space for study activities. I also did not focus on 
private industries; although drug and device manufacturers conduct human 
subjects protocols, they also may have a somewhat different set of liabilities as 
manufacturers. They also often rely on centralized IRBs, or may subcontract trials 
to hospitals or clinics. Limiting the scope of this project to hospitals and 
universities provides a first cut at the question of how research institutions resolve 
complaints and injuries involving human subjects, and subsequent work should 
focus on other research settings. 
Each interview lasted 60-90 minutes and focused on the types and frequency 
of complaints, experiences with litigation involving human subjects, the 
development and application of ADR procedures for resolving research-related 
disputes, the need for guidance or training to handle research-related disputes, and 
the principal values or priorities of the institutional ADR processes.102 I conducted 
and audio-recorded all interviews, then analyzed verbatim transcripts thematically 
using NVivo 11, which allows the application of a formal coding structure to 
qualitative data. I used an initial set of planned codes for data analysis, but added 
new themes as they emerged from the data. 
                                                 
 101 This sample size is appropriate for the collection of nuanced, in-depth data that explores 
variation and meaning in experiences, and it allows for data saturation. See Janice M. Morse, 
Determining Sample Size. 10 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 3 (2000); Janice M. Morse, The 
Significance of Saturation, 5 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 147 (1995). Data saturation refers to having 
collected sufficiently rich data to understand the key relationships at stake in the study—that is, 
collecting data until no new themes emerge with additional interviews—and although no formal 
metrics of saturation exist, qualitative researchers monitor their findings throughout studies to ensure 
that they research saturation before concluding data collection. See Morse, The Significance of 
Saturation; see also CONSTRUCTING GROUNDED THEORY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (Kathy Charmaz, ed. 2006). I monitored for data saturation throughout this 
work by completing and transcribing a debriefing after each interview, then rereading debriefing 
reports to identify new and recurring themes. The final sample enabled a thorough exploration of the 
themes of this paper. 
 102 Each individual participant provided informed consent to interviews, completed an 
interview by phone, and received $100 for their time. To protect institutions that may be experiencing 
research-related litigation, informed consent used an anonymous verbal process, and all data were 
deidentified before analysis. 
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Table 1 reports information on the individual informants, while Table 2 
reports information about the institutions they represented. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of individual respondents 
 

















Median Time in Current Position 4.5 years (range 0.25-25 years) 
Median Time in Research Protections 12 years (range 2-25 years) 













Certified IRB Professional (C.I.P.) Qualification 
 Currently Certified 
 Previously Certified 
 Lapsed 






B. Frequency and Types of Disputes 
Despite a wide and colorful variety of complaints that encompassed injuries, 
noncompliance, human resources issues, unwanted recruitment efforts, and 
cultural concerns, the overall frequency of complaints was far lower than might be 
expected. This low frequency was surprising to many informants, who sought to 
explain low system uptake as not only a result of good research practices, but also 
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Table 2. Characteristics of institutions. 
Characteristic Percentage (n = 30) 
Type of Institution 
 University with Affiliated Hospital 





















 Not Accredited 






Median Active Protocols 2,000 (range 20-
5,000) 
Median Annual Complaints per 1,000 protocols 2.2 (range 0-43.5) 
Written Policy or Procedure for Complaint Resolution 73% 
Previously Experienced Litigation Involving Human Subjects 30% 
Policy for Compensating Subjects for Physical Injury 
 Compensated Some or All Injuries 
 Compensated Depending on Sponsor Agreements 







1. Uptake of the Process 
At all but one institution, the IRBs were listed as the resources for participant 
complaints on patients’ informed consent forms; the remaining institution 
provided participants with information for a patient relations office, which reported 
any “non-trivial” complaints back to the IRB. Institutions handled between 20 and 
5000 protocols; the largest research programs were at universities that included 
medical schools, while hospitals and universities without medical schools had 
smaller research programs. Given the variety and commonplace nature of potential 
participant complaints noted above, the numbers of complaints received by IRBs 
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were surprisingly low, at an average of approximately 5 complaints per year per 
thousand active protocols. This figure reflects several outliers with larger numbers 
of complaints; the median complaint frequency was 2 complaints per year, per 
thousand active protocols. Complaints were somewhat more frequent at 
universities with medical schools (median 2.4 per year per thousand protocols), 
compared to universities without medical schools (median 0.5) and hospitals 
(median 1.8). Several institutions noted temporary spikes in complaints linked to 
identifiable events (e.g., media coverage of a protocol using an emergency 
exception to informed consent), but the stable frequency of complaints was around 
2-5 complaints per thousand protocols per year.103 Complaints were not spilling 
over into litigation instead; approximately one third of the institutions had been 
involved in litigation involving research subjects or staff, but these incidents were 
far less frequent than the number of complaints received. 
This Part will explore potential causes for the low frequency of complaints 
below. The low figures observed here align, however, with fields such as medical 
malpractice and complaints about healthcare professionals, in which “most people 
choose to ‘lump’ their grievance (i.e., put up with it or ignore it) or to avoid 
expressing it by ‘exiting’ (abandoning or limiting) the troublesome relationship. In 
the medical context . . . the vast majority of patients do not sue for negligently 
caused injuries . . . . Studies of complaining and claiming behavior are, therefore, 
studies of atypical behavior.”104 
2. Subject Matter of Complaints: Rights and Interests 
Despite this low uptake, when subjects do use the process, the subject matter 
of their complaints varies widely and encompasses both legally cognizable and 
non-justiciable claims. Complaints are typically brought by subjects themselves, 
or family members of participants who are minors, participants who have 
diminished capacity to consent, and participants who are ill or deceased. Study 
staff may also bring complaints as whistleblowers, particularly when complaints 
concern the conduct of principal investigators. I did not include here complaints 
from principal investigators about IRB actions; many institutions reported these, 
but because my focus is on research subject disputes, they were outside the focus 
of this study. 
Most institutions reported that complaints about the speed and adequacy of 
                                                 
 103 This is lower than a 2011 AAHRPP study that reported an average of 7.9 complaints per 
year per thousand protocols, among 193 AAHRPP-accredited institutions. My study included 
institutions with and without AAHRPP accreditation; the average for AAHRPP-accredited 
institutions was 4.0 complaints per year per thousand protocols. AAHRPP, Metrics on Human 
Research Protection Program Performance (2011). 
 104 Jost, supra note 29, at 314 
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participant compensation are most prevalent, particularly for participants enrolling 
in non-therapeutic protocols (who may be more interested in compensation, rather 
than receiving an experimental intervention). Other complaints include concerns 
about the availability and adequacy of the informed consent process (especially for 
non-English speakers, minors, or elderly participants); waivers of informed 
consent or HIPAA authorization; data privacy and confidentiality; the release of 
research reports or publications that did not protect participant confidentiality; 
disrespectful, nonresponsive, harassing, discriminatory, or dismissive treatment by 
research staff; staff noncompliance with study protocols; sexual harassment by 
research staff; dissatisfaction with emergency procedures for managing 
psychological events during research studies (e.g., threats of suicide); study 
requests for personal identifiers, especially Social Security numbers; unexpected, 
painful, or offensive study activities; requests for the return of biological samples; 
requests to discontinue participation; student concerns about the use of educational 
records; complaints about physical accessibility of study premises for individuals 
with disabilities; anger about premature study termination, where studies had been 
stopped by researchers, sponsors or the IRB; requests for access to individual study 
results or other records; concerns about future use of study samples or data; adverse 
social or legal consequences of participating in study procedures;105 
malfunctioning equipment or technology provided by a study; and cleanliness of 
study facilities. Complaints also include physical injuries, particularly where 
participants believe they had not received a timely and thorough response from the 
investigative team. 
Almost all institutions reported additional complaints from individuals not 
enrolled in research protocols. These complaints include community objections to 
study advertising (e.g., concerns about how study posters depict LGBT 
individuals); concerns about study recruitment and consent processes where 
sensitive protocols have received media attention; frustration with being found 
ineligible for participation in a particular study (particularly for patients who want 
access to a therapeutic protocol), or being excluded from a study midway through 
due to noncompliance or changes in eligibility; complaints that studies are wasting 
money on answering trivial or obvious research questions; concerns about repeated 
requests for study participation after refusal; student concerns about pressure to 
participate in professors’ research; complaints from community organizers about 
a mismatch between expected and actual research activities in the populations they 
represent; complaints about researchers’ misuse of access to medical records 
                                                 
 105 For example, one protocol enrolled a sex worker in an HIV vaccine trial, which causes the 
body to produce HIV antibodies despite the absence of infection. These antibodies caused her to test 
positive in an HIV antibody test when she was later arrested for prostitution, which triggered 
mandatory name-based reporting to the state and possibly enhanced penalties for the prostitution 
offense. 
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databases; and concerns from patients who were angry that the IRB had not yet 
approved a research protocol that they perceived to be beneficial. Some 
particularly sensitive complaints from non-participants also included concerns 
about culture, reputation, or identity; for example, complaints alleged that research 
results would harm the reputation of a community or organization, or that 
researchers were making inappropriate use of biological samples to study a Native 
American community. 
Numerous institutions had received complaints from individuals who had 
been identified and contacted as potential subjects on the basis of their medical 
records or a state registry (e.g., asked to be in a prostate cancer study because their 
medical records included a prostate cancer diagnosis), which did not fit their 
expectations of medical record privacy. Institutions who reported these complaints 
had almost universally enacted institutional policy changes barring investigators 
from cold-calling participants on the basis of their medical records. 
C. Process Goals and Values 
Despite the heterogeneity across institutions in location, type of institution, 
and size, there were remarkable similarities in how institutions viewed their 
proximate goals and underlying process values. This Section will discuss each in 
turn, noting similarities in how informants described their systems. 
1. Proximate Goals 
Informants reflected on a number of institutional goals for their dispute 
resolution systems. These goals included system outputs that are separable (and 
often measurable) results of the process (e.g., participant satisfaction), as well as a 
common set of desirable procedural features (e.g., neutrality of the decision-maker, 
transparency). 
Most informants noted that the IRB’s institutional role is to protect subjects 
enrolled in research protocols; the quality of decisions depended on how well they 
fulfilled this substantive goal, in addition to complying with federal regulations 
and ethical guidance. For these institutions, complaints are a source of feedback 
for modifying risky protocols or practices, and the resolution process sometimes 
led to system-level changes to policies applying across the institution.106 Subject 
and investigator satisfaction with the process—if not the outcome—is also a 
primary goal at all institutions, and informants often described “customer 
satisfaction” or a “consumer service” approach for subjects as an overriding 
emphasis. As expected, another salient goal of this process is to protect the 
institution itself from litigation and adverse media exposure, in part by satisfying 
                                                 
 106 See Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 34. 
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individual subjects’ concerns, but also by maintaining an active feedback loop that 
identifies systemic risks. IRBs noted that individual or repeated complaints can 
identify defects in institutional policies, providing opportunities for revision and 
reform. As one informant noted, “The most important thing is to ensure the patient 
is, feels comfortable in the resolution . . . I guess secondly would be to ensure that 
we’ve implemented whatever processes need to happen to ensure it doesn’t happen 
again.” Or as another said, “[We have] more policy-type resolutions so that I can 
go back to [an] individual and say . . . the institution has now changed its policy in 
a way this will not happen again . . . . A quality resolution . . . is not just a quick 
band-aid fix, but more of a long-term, proactive [step].” 
Like many ADR processes, these systems aim for efficiency, speed, and 
accuracy, in part assured by the procedural flexibility inherent in the system 
design.107 Speed was often cited as a goal of complaint resolution, with multiple 
informants noting that lengthy complaint processes may foster escalation of the 
dispute, particularly if parties are not kept abreast of progress. Consistency was 
another procedural goal, often fostered by written or standardized procedures. 
Conserving financial and administrative costs, however, was not typically a 
priority, and the costs of the ADR process were viewed as small in comparison to 
the threat of litigation and reputational exposures for the institution. Informants 
reported willingness to devote considerable time and resources to complaints in 
the interests of accuracy and fairness, and the low number of complaints enabled 
IRBs to prioritize thoroughness over administrative costs. (“As far as time, 
manpower, and all of that is concerned, I think you have to spend what you have 
to spend in order to make it a fair process.”) Moreover, very few complainants 
sought financial compensation for their grievances, with the exception of 
participants with uncompensated injuries or complaints related to expected 
payment for study activities. 
In order to fulfill these proximate goals, institutions sought to create processes 
with a number of ideal safeguards. These included an easily accessible forum; 
having a written procedure or having the same personnel respond to all complaints; 
a full opportunity for subjects and investigators to provide their version of the facts, 
including in-person or phone meetings with the IRB; options for the subject to elect 
anonymity or choose not to pursue corrective action; an opportunity for parties to 
choose facilitated negotiation or mediation; an initial triage point that allows for 
emergency actions such as study suspension; transparency about the process and 
communication of the outcome to investigators and subjects; provision of a third-
party neutral with the authority to issue decisions that bind the institution; 
consultation of all complaint stakeholders and institutional actors, including 
trusted members of the subject’s community where relevant; privacy of 
                                                 
 107 See infra, Section III.E. 
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deliberations and decisions by the third-party neutral; a thorough fact-finding 
process that consults all relevant parties; a written, reasoned decision; 
opportunities for the investigator to weigh in on the corrective action plan; and an 
option to appeal. 
2. Values of the Process 
Informants’ beliefs about the underlying value of a complaint resolution 
process reflected many, if not all, of the process values described in Part II above. 
The value of participation resonated most deeply throughout the interviews, both 
as an instrumental value (necessary to reach a resolution, promote legitimacy, or 
defuse conflict) and as an inherent value (an independent good for subjects who 
exert their autonomy by complaining). Informants intuitively described some 
themes arising in the procedural justice literature, such as an “opportunity to be 
heard” (voice); the need to treat participants empathetically and respectfully 
(courtesy); the need to provide a forum that approximates a neutral third party 
(neutrality); and the need for the IRB to be trustworthy or receive buy-in from 
trusted community authorities (trust). Procedures that involve all possible 
stakeholders to a complaint also advance participation values, and may also 
increase the legitimacy of both the forum and the substantive decisions made by 
the IRBs. 
Equality between the subject and investigator is a second value, given IRB’s 
efforts to provide neutral decisions and full participation opportunities for both 
sides. Accountability of the investigator for wrongs was an important corollary to 
this principle; importantly, however, this accountability is one-sided. Although the 
IRBs can compel investigators to take corrective actions, they have neither the 
authority nor the desire to sanction subjects. Of course, a final IRB decision that is 
adverse to the subject forecloses other options, particularly for non-justiciable 
complaints. But subjects cannot be made worse off ex post. The focus of 
accountability was also on individual investigators rather than the institution more 
generally, save for physical injuries (which may be compensated by institutional 
funds) and complaints that specifically alleged misconduct elsewhere in the 
institution (e.g., negligent approval of protocols by the IRB itself). 
Informants’ focus on consistency and the need for procedural transparency 
with complainants and investigators suggested that predictability was an important 
goal. Informants did not, however, identify the need to provide procedural 
information to subjects before the act of bringing a complaint. Indeed, very little 
about the process was disclosed ex ante, in part because IRBs maintained so much 
procedural discretion that precise procedural details were not known in advance. 
As overseers of the informed consent process, IRBs are well acquainted with the 
problems of how best to disclose information to research subjects. The difficulties 
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of obtaining informed consent are notorious.108 Limited time is available for 
obtaining informed consent; participants may already be overwhelmed with 
information about the details of the research protocol; and the informed consent 
process often fails to present information in an accessible way. Prior studies have 
consistently found deficiencies in informed consent. One review found that 
participants lacked adequate comprehension of the study in 29% of research 
protocols, and lacked comprehension of the risks of surgery in 36% of surgical 
research protocols.109 Participants in only 44% of protocols knew that they could 
withdraw from the study.110 Studies worldwide have found similar results, showing 
that comprehension varies widely, and that randomization and placebo-controlled 
trials present particular stumbling blocks for comprehension.111 When it is already 
difficult to present significant facts about the research protocol in an accessible 
way, researchers may be limited in their ability to disclose detailed procedural 
information about participants’ dispute resolution options. Against this backdrop, 
informants in the present study generally had not questioned the current practice 
of disclosing IRBs’ contact information without further details about the dispute 
resolution process. 
Informants were less likely to describe privacy as an independent value, with 
the exception of privacy for investigators who experience disciplinary sanctions. 
Instead, procedures safeguarded privacy interests in an effort to promote 
participation values, particularly in the use of procedures to receive and manage 
complaints made by subjects who wished to stay anonymous or confidential. No 
informant described using a formal confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement 
during the process, but internal deliberations of the IRB were wholly confidential 
as an institutional practice. 
Finally, a number of legitimacy interests were served by a well-functioning 
complaint process. These included the legitimacy of the IRBs’ substantive 
decisions about complaints, but also legitimacy of the institution, particularly in its 
relationships with research communities, as well as the legitimacy of science more 
generally, as some later quotes will demonstrate. As one informant noted, “We 
protect human subjects and we facilitate research at the institution, because 
research with human subjects does improve healthcare at the end of the day . . . . 
it’s important that our institution be trusted to have the best interest of our patients 
and you know, um, society in the research that we’re doing.” 
                                                 
 108 Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging Challenges of Informed Consent, 372 N. ENGL. 
J. MED. 855 (2015); Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present 
Challenges, 20 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 515 (2011). 
 109 Falagas, supra note 7. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Amulya Mandava, et al., The Quality of informed Consent: Mapping the Landscape. A 
Review of Empirical Data from Developing and Developed Countries, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 356 (2012). 
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In addition to these intuitive process values, some informants also sought to 
advance the values of the Belmont Report on ethical research with human subjects. 
These particularly included respect for subjects’ autonomy and the need for 
beneficence and non-maleficence toward research subjects. These values might be 
reclassified into the interests above, such as dignity and equality—but the Belmont 
Report is unique to the lopsided power structures in the research setting, and may 
be less instructive for other types of IDR. 
D. Elements of Process 
Despite the lack of regulatory guidance on how institutions should handle 
research-related disputes—which might be expected to generate some 
heterogeneity in dispute system design—almost all institutions have developed 
similar and procedurally flexible dispute resolution systems. Even where some 
institutions differ slightly (e.g., a few hold institutional insurance for subject 
injuries; a few request local community leader involvement for disputes arising in 
foreign or culturally distinct groups; a few have a patient representative), the 
contours of the basic process remain the same. Although this may result in part 
from the process of AAHRPP accreditation, AAHRPP does not mandate particular 
dispute system design features, and even the institutions that were not accredited 
handle disputes similarly. This Section will therefore group all types of institutions 
together for the analysis. 
Across institutions, complaint resolution processes most commonly resembles 
binding arbitration for disputes that are not the result of a factual misunderstanding. 
For minor disputes arising solely from a misunderstanding or miscommunication, 
the process may be more similar to facilitated negotiation or even simple 
education. All processes are developed and managed internally by the IRB, and 
they rely on the IRB to issue binding decisions as a third-party neutral vis a vis the 
participant and investigator. Processes follow a rough timeline of complaint 
receipt, internal discussion of procedural options, “fact-finding” carried out 
directly by the IRB or a research compliance team, deliberation by the IRB, and 
issuance of a binding, written resolution enforced by the IRB’s authority to 
approve or disapprove the research protocol. The remainder of this Section will 
consider the origins of these processes, procedural similarities across institutions, 
and the chronological series of steps in the process. 
1. IRB as Dispute System Designer: Process Origins and Design 
Almost all the institutional processes in this study arose informally within the 
IRB and solidified over time, as IRBs received specific, but rare complaint calls 
from research subjects. Where institutions had an ex ante process, it was typically 
created as part of a broader reorganization of the IRB, or it was imported by a new 
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director or chair familiar with a process from a previous institution. A minority of 
institutions had no written process for managing complaints; they considered this 
an “office practice,” or believed that they experienced too few complaints per year 
to require a written procedure (“I mean it happens maybe five times a year so, uh, 
knock on wood”). The likelihood of having a written policy differed little 
depending on the type of institution (hospitals, universities with or without medical 
schools). These written procedures were internal, and although several institutions 
post them internally, none described making them available to research subjects at 
the time of enrollment. No institution mentioned consulting subjects or subject 
representatives systematically at the time of process design.112 
Where institutions had written procedures, most had developed them to fulfill 
the requirements set by AAHRPP.113 Many, but not all, had consulted other 
institutions’ policies at the time of accreditation. Informants at other institutions, 
including non-accredited programs, noted that they had developed written policies 
unprompted to increase efficiency (“[Before our written procedure,] not everybody 
was consistent, things were getting missed.”), and to increase consistency across 
protocols and over time (“I think that’s your biggest, you know, benefit is making 
sure that everything is handled in a fair, unbiased, consistent manner.”).114 The 
central goals of process standardization were to ensure similar treatment across all 
participants and investigators, and to reduce biased procedural decisions that may 
arise from prior knowledge of the investigator. 
Whenever an issue came up that we needed to resolve, we realized 
that we shouldn’t do it ad hoc, you know depending on the PI 
[principal investigator]. If we knew the PI was a good guy to do 
one thing versus, um, doing something else. So we, we realized 
back then you’re much better off to have upfront processes put 
into place -- to treat everyone the same -- and go down the same 
algorithm of decisions -- versus a hit or miss, which is you know 
what we were doing before we had the SOP [statement of 
procedure] in place. 
It’s really important to us as an institution and as an office 
                                                 
 112 One institution did, however, involve a patient representative throughout the process and 
involved that person in the process design. 
 113 Eighteen of the thirty institutions were accredited or pending accreditation, including all six 
hospitals, 12 of the universities with medical schools, and none of the universities without medical 
schools. 
 114 One institution had also interpreted the federal regulations and OHRP guidance on 
mandatory reporting of unanticipated problems to require a written process for resolving complaints, 
in the event that complaints alleged such problems or noncompliance. Other institutions, however, 
had not interpreted the regulations this way. 
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specifically that we want to set precedent. Like we want to treat 
each case as very similar, we want to have a very similar outcome 
and so if we determine that we have a different outcome, we want 
to look at why . . . . There are investigators that have, uh, have 
kind of proven themselves to be very quality investigators, and 
then certainly I think every institution has investigators that are 
known to be a little bit less by the book . . . . But if the same 
complaint came in, the equivalent complaint came in under the 
same two, you know, under these two investigators, they should 
be handled exactly the same with the same neutral approach. 
Both those with written and unwritten procedures, however, believed that a 
written procedure would be important in the event that a subject complaint resulted 
in litigation. For example, one institution without a written procedure suggested 
that they may be “at risk for not having it more codified . . . . But, you know, 
usually something bad has to happen and then you become codified.” An 
institution with a standard written process noted that a key motivation was the 
belief that own compliance with internal procedures would have value in litigation. 
Some complaints . . . were bypassing [the director’s] office and 
going right to [the IRB] committee. And they were meritless. And 
then there were other complaints that would come to me but there 
was no formal process -- there was no standard operating 
procedure . . . . And so we just codified the, um, process flow . . . . 
You know, if it did get to litigation we -- we could say that we 
were or were not following our own internal policies. So [we 
shifted] from no policy to policy. Based on experience, we knew 
what worked and what wasn’t working. We knew where 
exposures were . . . legal exposures, regulatory exposures. 
Most institutions noted that they continued to revise and update their processes 
over time, to respond to changes in complaints or the institutional environment 
(“We learn what works and what doesn’t work and what’s more efficient for the 
participant and the study team . . . . It’s a continual learning basis.”). Whether 
procedures were written or unwritten, however, basic procedural features and 
proximate process goals were similar across institutions, and all relied on the IRB 
as a third-party neutral, as the next sections will note. 
2. IRB as Complaint Line: Initial Contact 
All IRBs provide their contact information to subjects via the informed 
consent form, or if a verbal informed consent process is used, subjects receive 
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independent notice of the IRB contact information. Most subjects communicate 
complaints by phone, although some IRBs noted receiving isolated complaints by 
email or (sometimes-anonymous) written letter or email, and these IRBs responded 
by phone if possible. Phone calls may direct to a general office, but they are then 
redirected to a single person such as the director, administrator, chair, or manager 
of the IRB.115 Institutions that received complaints through other channels, such as 
those going to the president or provost’s office in a university, typically referred 
these back to the IRB. Most institutions do not require a written complaint; instead, 
the IRB personnel prepares a written description on behalf of the subject at the 
time of the call, and some fill out standard forms during the call to ensure that they 
are obtaining all the relevant information. 
Almost without exception, the informants emphasized the importance of the 
initial conversation with an aggrieved subject. The immediate goals of this 
conversation are to obtain a detailed description of the complaint, to identify the 
relevant protocol and investigator, to identify any previous efforts to resolve the 
complaint with the investigator, to identify threats of violence or psychological 
needs, and to understand the remedy that the subject was requesting, if any. But at 
the time of first contact, IRBs also seek to provide the subject with a full 
opportunity to voice their complaint without interruption, to ensure that the subject 
feels heard and respected, to express respect and empathy, and to convey that the 
subject has been heard by someone who has the institutional authority to resolve 
the dispute. 
The number one thing we’re trying to do is to listen, even if we 
don’t get a complete understanding of the complaint, I mean, 
that’s another goal, but the most important thing is that the person 
on the other end hangs up the phone feeling that they were heard. 
They want to get to somebody right away, without having to go 
through lots of different people, who has the authority and 
responsibility to listen to them and to, who can help them. So 
that’s number one. And then number two, our perception is that, 
uh, they want somebody who’s going to listen, um, in an 
empathetic way. 
The primary goal actually is to ensure that the subject feels heard. 
To make sure that whoever is calling, whatever the concern is, that 
they have some hope that in fact, uh, someone is going to take 
their call seriously. And while we obviously cannot, uh, promise 
to the caller that whatever resolution happens will be done, you 
                                                 
 115 Several forms also provide numbers for multiple contacts at the IRB, in cases where the 
IRB chairs also conduct research and may have complaints arising in their own research studies. 
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know, to his or her satisfaction -- we can at least reassure the caller 
that, um, they’ve, they’ve reached someone who is going to help 
them. 
I want to, um, allow them to tell their story . . . being, you know, 
caring and, um, respectful . . . . I would confirm back to them that, 
you know, we understand that it’s upsetting to them . . . . Once 
I’ve heard from them I like to clarify back to them what I heard 
and what my understanding is of their concern . . . [I’m] making 
it clear that their concerns have been heard and understood. People 
really need to be heard. 
Informants noted that hearing the subject could serve instrumental reasons—
it can help defuse emotions and ensure that the process is responsive, and 
sometimes having a voice fulfills the subject’s entire goal in complaining (“Some 
people will call and say, you know, here’s my grief, but at the end of the day they 
just want to vent and don’t really want me to follow up with that, and don’t want 
to leave their name and number.”). Informants also noted, however, that this also 
serves inherent values that might be described as dignity interests, at least in our 
taxonomy of process values—here, these interests include the desire to be “taken 
seriously” and to have someone in power acknowledge the emotional impact of 
the perceived wrong. These expressions of empathy can also promote legitimacy 
of the process and institution, as one informant noted: 
Usually if they know that you’re concerned about them . . . this 
reflects on us as much as anybody else. We want research to be 
done ethically. We want all research participants to feel like they 
can come to us with any um concern or complaint and so I usually 
reassure them to let them know that we take every complaint 
seriously, that we’ll investigate it, and we’ll work with them until 
the problem is resolved. 
3. IRB as Communicator: Ongoing Communications with Participants and 
Investigators 
At the time of initial contact, most institutions also offer participants some 
input on process and offer procedural safeguards. All institutions offer subjects the 
opportunity to make their complaint anonymously, without disclosing their 
identity at all, or confidentially, without disclosing their identity to the 
investigator.116 (They note, however, that anonymity or confidentiality may limit 
                                                 
 116 One institution even maintains a fully anonymous, non-staffed phone line that anonymizes 
calls, for people who wish to leave a message without any link to their identity. 
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the options for resolutions in complaints regarding compensation, investigator 
misconduct, or harassment.) IRBs typically give participants the option to continue 
the process toward resolution or corrective action, or to stop the process after the 
initial call. One IRB member noted that giving the participant this flexibility was 
an important part of respect for autonomy, which is a core principle of the Belmont 
Report ethical guidance for research. In the dispute resolution context, this aligns 
with the broader dignitary and participatory values of process. 
If they, if they want it to just be a venting session, I’m here to 
listen. But if they, if they do need some additional follow-up I 
wanna make sure that they have the control as much as is 
appropriate . . . . Research again is not . . . your standard clinical 
treatment . . . . Our participants are volunteering to be in this 
research, that they’re not compelled, and I think it’s important that 
we respect and honor their contributions to the research. They can 
withdraw at any time and I, I guess it’s just part of the respect of 
persons, kind of getting back to that ethical principle, um, in the 
Belmont Re[port that I think is, is important. 
Another recurring theme throughout these interviews was the need to maintain 
continuous contact with participants and investigators, including informing them 
of the steps of the process as they occur. Informants viewed this communication 
channel as in part an extension of voice and the value of participation, as well as 
serving broader dignity goals; as one informant noted, “It’s important to be 
transparent . . . . it usually turns out to be much worse if you don’t keep the, the 
complainant in the loop so that they feel like they’re actually being listened to . . . 
I think transparency and neutrality are more important because I’m not really sure 
there is such a thing as the right resolution.” Some IRBs set frequencies for re-
contacting subjects and investigators during a complaint, such as making contact 
on a weekly basis. 
Informants also noted the need for transparency of process to improve 
satisfaction among both investigators and subjects. One informant, for example, 
described a change in practice to discontinue an informal process that was “never 
really clear on the policy” and “would cherry-pick what they wanted to do.” In 
their new process, “if somebody had a complaint we would send an email and 
explain what our steps are going to be [to the subject] and a researcher if we were 
going to audit them . . . we tr[y] to be user-friendly and have clear understanding 
of what the role is and what’s going to happen . . . and it’s made the situation 
better.” Another agreed that transparency directly affects perceived legitimacy: 
“Communication in really key . . . in order to be transparent . . . . I think even in 
the tough situations most people are respectful of how you undertake the process, 
knowing that it is a difficult process.” 
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IRBs are aware that the stakes of complaints are high for investigators, 
particularly when subjects express concern about the investigators’ own conduct 
or noncompliance. As one informant noted, researchers are “typically in a 
defensive stance” during complaints. Transparency of process was viewed as an 
important safeguard for investigators, who may also have more notice of IRB 
practices through investigator training, repeated interactions with the system, or 
access to internal institutional policy documents. Information about process can 
also alleviate investigators’ feelings of being wrongly accused or the target of bias, 
as one informant noted: “We have to let them know that we have to investigate 
every single call regardless of feelings, regardless of anything . . . and a lot of times 
they know it’s a process that we have to go through.” 
4. IRB as Mediator: Process Selection and Resolution of Minor Complaints 
After the initial contact, the IRB director or manager makes a preliminary 
determination about the severity and likely veracity of the complaint.117 Where 
there are urgent or emergency issues involving risks to subjects, the most senior 
IRB official (the chair) or a subcommittee of the IRB will immediately assemble 
and recommend emergency measures, such as suspending study activities. But for 
most types of minor complaints, the IRB personnel will begin by contacting the 
principal investigator of the research study by phone or email, to identify whether 
the complaint can be easily resolved. Many complaints are easily classified as 
minor issues that can be resolved via communication between the subject and 
principal investigator (e.g., missing compensation), or via a direct, second 
conversation with the individual (e.g., explaining why the person was not eligible 
for a particular protocol). The IRB director, manager, or chair typically takes these 
actions directly,118 notifying the principal investigator or re-contacting the 
complainant to explain features of the study or informed consent form. A number 
of IRB chairs noted a practice of directly facilitating conversations between 
subjects and investigators, with the chair personally serving as a third-party 
mediator to ensure that the communication went smoothly. 
[I] try to set up a, you know, a meeting between them and the 
investigator so they can address these issues . . . . Most conflicts I 
think it’s best when everybody is sitting down and talking to each 
other . . . . That’s one of our first outreaches with any sort of 
problem, whether it’s just an investigator or a study problem, is to 
                                                 
 117 Several informants noted that concerns about veracity can be particularly important for 
complaints arising in psychiatric studies. “A lot of the complaints may also be from psychiatric 
patients . . . . So I sort of probe how closely their complaint is grounded in reality.” 
 118 Where subjects report not having spoken with the investigator yet, many IRBs will suggest 
that the subject do so directly before proceeding. 
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try to get everybody in the same room and talk about it. If it looks 
like it’s a problem that could be solved by just people talking to 
each other or looking at what the different options are, that’s 
always, that’s always our first approach. 
The time to resolution for these minor complaints is typically hours or days, 
and multiple informants described the procedure in these cases as a “customer 
service” approach, centered on listening and the subject’s desire to be heard. 
5. IRB as Fact-Finder: Iterative Investigation and Consultation for Serious 
Complaints 
Where complaints do not arise from miscommunication or misunderstanding, 
however, the process escalates to resemble arbitration, in which the IRB takes on 
both a fact-finding and adjudicatory role and imposes a resolution that is enforced 
by institutional authority over the research protocol. The IRB chair, along with any 
other IRB personnel who initially received the complaint, makes a preliminary 
classification of the issues, rights, and individuals at stake, and determines whether 
other institutional actors should be involved in the resolution process. Where the 
IRB reports to an additional institutional authority, such as the vice president or 
chancellor for research, the IRB personnel will likely include this person in the 
decision about involving other departments. 
Depending on the nature of the complaint, the IRB may choose to involve a 
wide array of offices or personnel within the institution. The role of these personnel 
is typically to provide guidance or to assist in fact-finding. These may include the 
institution’s general counsel (for complaints that include legal claims, injuries, or 
potential legal violations, such as failures of informed consent or HIPAA 
violations), any insurance program for research-related injury, the human 
resources office for complaints involving whistleblowers or investigator 
misconduct, the risk management office, the regulatory affairs department, FERPA 
officials, the office for privacy and HIPAA, media affairs (for disputes receiving 
media attention), institutional officials serving as research subject advocates or 
patient advocates, university ombudsmen, campus police or security for disputes 
where subjects or investigators may threaten violence, institutional officials for 
sponsored projects, and departmental heads or chairs of the investigator’s 
department. All dispute resolution processes for complaints alleging 
noncompliance with protocols will also involve a compliance team, which may be 
a subcommittee of the IRB, a single IRB officer such as a quality improvement 
officer, or a separate arm of the broader human research protection program. 
The IRB chair and other institutional officials may also gauge whether the 
complaint requires contacts with people outside the university—for example, 
research sponsors who may need to approve protocol changes, local police who 
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were arresting participants leaving a study for sex workers, a state agency that had 
made a name-based registry of cancer patients available to researchers, a local 
school board for a dispute about informed consent for school-based research, or a 
tribal council for a dispute over the return of biological samples to tribe members. 
IRBs also work with foreign IRBs, for international research protocols that require 
review by institutions in multiple countries. 
After identifying the relevant stakeholders, rights, and interests, the IRB 
typically begins a flexible and sometimes iterative process of fact-finding, 
consideration of facts and interests, and communication with the investigator, 
research staff, participant, and other institutional or outside actors. The fact-finding 
process may include a formal audit of study materials or less formal interviews 
with the investigator and study staff. The IRB may conduct this process itself 
through a subcommittee or individual staff members;119 it may also use a 
compliance office or risk management team.120 The process can last up to six 
months or even a year for complicated or contentious disputes, but more typically 
lasts about one month. 
6. IRB as Client: Outsourcing Disputes 
During consultation with other institutional stakeholders, senior members of 
the institution may decide to reallocate control of the dispute resolution process to 
legal counsel or human resources departments. Where this occurs, the IRB loses 
jurisdiction over the dispute. “[If] the institution wants to move forward with it or 
take it to a different level or address that we kind of bow out from a jurisdiction 
perspective.” 
Even when the IRB retains management of the dispute, however, they may 
rely on institutions’ legal counsel for guidance, interpretation of applicable 
institutional policies or external regulations, or communication with research 
participants’ counsel. Some informants believed that legal counsel were reliable 
supporters and valuable resources for most complaints. But others noted that legal 
counsel could actually complicate complaint resolution; their concern for 
institutional liability encourages defensive communication with subjects, rather 
than the empathy and concern that most IRBs thought was the necessary tone to 
achieve a resolution. 
We don’t necessarily have to bring the attorneys in right from the 
beginning, and they don’t drive the process . . . . They’re focused, 
                                                 
 119 One hospital also reported having institutional legal counsel attend fact-finding interviews, 
“to give [research staff] comfort and reassurance” that they will not be penalized for honest responses. 
 120 In one dispute concerning the behavior of the IRB itself, the IRB asked another institution’s 
IRB to assist in the factfinding and dispute resolution process. 
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of course, on protecting the university . . . and that’s great. But 
that often is at odds with trying to resolve the participant 
complaint. In an ideal world, everybody would agree that 
resolving the complaint is not only the right thing to do but will 
prevent the litigation. But sometimes those are a little bit at odds 
and so we get into sort of a—if the attorneys are prominently 
involved—sort of a protective mode where um, we’re not 
necessarily free to be as compassionate. Even if we’re not 
agreeing with the participant necessarily, we want to be able to 
still interact with them in a way that displays empathy and 
compassion, and sometimes that can be a little bit of a challenge 
when the attorneys are involved. 
A few research institutions had instituted a procedural innovation to address 
protocols that take place in international or culturally distinctive settings, where 
subjects may be uncomfortable with approaching the institution directly. These 
institutions sometimes required investigators to appoint a local community leader 
to assist in resolving disputes arising in any protocols; this person could liaise 
between the subject community and the institution where needed. The community 
representative was listed on informed consent forms and became a point of contact 
for receiving complaints, and also an active part of the resolution process for any 
complaints that rose to the level of the IRB. 
We look for an alternate, uh, position in the community, a 
trustworthy person in the community to accept those and refer 
them to us for handling . . . . It’s all a part of being sensitive to the 
population that are being recruited . . . . It includes having a 
person in that community who would be perceived as being 
impartial and would listen and refer the, the problems and 
concerns to us . . . . It can be used in remote, anything that is 
remote from our site or which is culturally inaccessible, like an 
Indian tribe . . . . [And] for our sake they would be um, um at a 
leadership community leadership level that they would in an 
informed way communicate with the IRB here. 
This institution raises interesting questions about the relationship between the 
research institution and the participant population. 
7. IRB as Adjudicator: Deliberation, Decisions, and Appeals 
When fact-finding is complete, IRBs proceed to deliberation, which remains 
internal to the IRB for most types of complaints. Factual findings and the results 
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of conversations with various stakeholders are recorded and assembled by the IRB, 
along with guidance from other relevant institutional actors. The IRB may 
designate a subcommittee or ask the full board to examine the factual findings, 
guidance, and interests at stake. This decision body recommends a preliminary 
solution that may be acceptable to the parties, including any proposed remedies or 
corrective action plans. Many IRBs at this stage will communicate directly with 
the principal investigator in advance of the final decision, attempting to find a 
voluntary set of protocol corrections or a remediation plan that the investigator 
would find feasible and acceptable. Several informants described this process as 
prioritizing transparency and participation throughout the crafting of a resolution, 
while others noted that unrealistic corrective action plans may undermine the 
durability of the resolution: 
We do try to be transparent, um, listen to both parties, and then 
come to collaborative solutions that would really involve all 
parties trying to create the solution . . . . My preference is not to 
impose solutions as much as to say, “What would be your solution 
given your particular environment that you conduct the study in?” 
. . . . Of course, if it’s a regulatory piece then we have no 
flexibility, then we tend to impose, but even within that imposition 
it would be my style to say, “Well, how is that going to work for 
you?” 
We work together on a solution that’s more of a learning 
experience. We don’t want it to be punitive for either party . . . 
especially our PIs because sometimes . . . they didn’t realize they 
were doing anything wrong . . . . So depending on the solution, a 
lot of times we may involve the PI into the solution. 
We don’t want to impose . . . a bunch of strict regulations on a 
study team that will in essence make them be noncompliant in the 
future if they’re unable to fulfill that corrective or preventive 
action plan. 
The process concludes with a full IRB decision to approve a corrective action 
plan and to formally issue a written letter to the principal investigator, setting forth 
the facts and corrective action requirements. IRBs often notify the subject of the 
final resolution as well, although the subject does not typically receive a copy of 
the same letter. The IRB determines what will be disclosed to the participant at this 
time, which may be in writing or by phone, and may contain less detailed 
information. As one informant noted, “We may say [an investigator was] 
disciplined but we won’t say . . . what the specific disciplinary action was 
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because . . . we have to keep in mind the faculty member and the investigator, their 
rights.” 
According to many informants, the IRB’s authority to make binding decisions 
on research-related complaints arises from the federal regulations, which task IRBs 
with the approval or disapproval of research protocols. As one informant noted, 
“Because our IRB, you know . . . [we] have that federal regulatory mandate to be 
the final decision makers . . . even when people appeal [an adverse decision], it 
typically doesn’t result in a significant change.” 
After the final decision, almost all institutions give the principal investigator 
a right to appeal for reconsideration by the chair, the full IRB, a vice president for 
research, or the chief medical officer. No institution described making this option 
available to the subject, because subjects cannot experience sanctions as a result 
of a complaint. But when prompted, many IRBs said that a subject who is 
dissatisfied with the resolution of their complaint could likely obtain 
reconsideration as well. 
Subjects who invoke the dispute resolution process do not give up other legal 
remedies; nothing forecloses a public lawsuit after the process ends.121 Informed 
consent forms do not require subjects to use the dispute resolution process at the 
institution—mandatory arbitration is curiously absent in this context. But because 
so many disputes are based on non-justiciable interests rather than legal rights, the 
IRB’s decision is typically the only available remedy. Investigators can (and 
sometimes do) sue institutions in connection with research-related disputes, but 
individual subjects typically are not involved in public investigator-institution 
disputes. 
8. IRB as Enforcer: Remedies 
IRBs noted many options for remedying research-related injuries, all 
enforceable by the sanction of closing research protocols that do not comply with 
remediation plans. Financial settlements were possible but rare, and the negotiation 
of these settlements typically involved legal counsel. Only a small handful of 
institutions had a public policy of compensating research-related injuries, either by 
insurance or institutional funds; a majority, however, noted that they either paid 
for treating injuries at their own facilities, or they eventually provided funds for 
treating any research-related injuries that are not covered by subjects’ own health 
insurance. This is an important informal policy, given that most consent forms 
specifically state that research sponsors and the institution are not obligated to pay 
for treating research-related injuries. Informants did not describe apologies as an 
available remedy, but noted that subjects did receive explanations of events where 
                                                 
 121 It is possible, however, that subjects who receive compensation for injury do need to waive 
the ability to sue as a condition of settlement. See Pike article. But these are a minority of cases. 
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relevant. 
Other remedies include changes to individual protocols, such as mandatory 
changes to training and supervision procedures for research staff, changes in 
recruitment strategies, changes to the informed consent process, or changes in 
criteria for initial or continued eligibility. Some of these protocol changes are 
reportable to study sponsors, as are complaints that are determined to arise from 
serious adverse events or unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects. IRBs 
can also require training or directed education of investigators or staff on issues 
like informed consent or record-keeping. For more severe or irremediable 
violations, IRBs can terminate studies or entire lines of research, mandate the 
destruction or nonuse of data, or require the return of biological samples to 
subjects. Where investigations reveal serious or recurring noncompliance, 
scientific misconduct, or HR violations, researchers may also experience 
professional sanctions or discipline through the HR department. 
Some complaints led to thoroughgoing changes in institutional policies, such 
as the discontinuation of recruitment practices that involve cold-calling, changed 
policies for the supervision of students, a discontinuation of studies that consented 
participants under the influence of alcohol, new policies for training researchers 
and staff, and changes to institution-wide informed consent practices. 
9. IRB as Record-Keeper: Missed Opportunities 
Most institutions kept written records of complaints, but these were typically 
filed under individual protocols; only a few institutions systematically recorded 
complaints using a method that would allow for analysis over time or across 
protocols. Feedback from dispute resolution programs could assist IRBs in 
identifying research risks and burdens, but IRBs are neglecting this opportunity to 
use disputes as information. Ideally, IRBs should record complaints in a manner 
that would allow personnel to aggregate or compare issues across protocols. A 
periodic analysis of these complaint data could help IRBs anticipate risks and 
burdens at the protocol approval stage, rather than waiting for complaints to arise. 
IRBs could also use these data to identify recurring complaints arising from 
particular departments or protocol types, which could be remedied by 
improvements in investigator training or institutional research procedures. 
E. The Centrality and Limitations of Procedural Flexibility in IDR 
Throughout the interviews, the IRB informants consistently noted the 
advantages of a highly flexible complaint resolution process.122 Even where 
                                                 
 122 The informality of IRBs’ own protocols, records, and procedures may amuse many 
researchers who prepare highly detailed and inflexible protocols to comply with IRB requirements. 
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procedures were written, informants described leaving broad latitude to select 
among process options, or supplementing the written process to include additional 
elements. 
We have to have a written policy that we handle complaints, but 
we leave it as open as we possibly can, um, we provide a range of 
possible responses depending on what the, you know, the level of 
severity, etc . . . . You don’t want to lock yourself into having to, 
you know, you don’t want to say in your policy we will respond 
in writing to all complaints if that’s not appropriate . . . . So you 
then leave yourself open to being able to, um, respond in a, you 
know, um, issue specific manner that’s appropriate for what’s 
going on. 
[The process is] just based on the situation at hand . . . . We have 
on paper a policy and process . . . . But if we, you know, run into 
an obstacle or a snag or, you know, if we needed additional 
information, we might make a decision that’s not written 
somewhere. But again, only with the same intent, which is . . . 
[that] all parties are being, you know, properly addressed, you 
know, properly, um, given the proper opportunity to kind of speak. 
Informants believed that the principal benefits of procedural flexibility were 
the opportunity to tailor the process for complaints with a range of rights and 
interests; to involve all relevant institutional and outside personnel in the response; 
and to provide full voice to any unforeseeable parties that may have a stake in the 
events or their resolution. Some of these benefits serve efficiency—that is, 
standardized procedural features may waste time and resources. For example, it is 
costly in time and manpower to conduct full audits for complaints that might be 
easily resolved through facilitated negotiation. These efficiency benefits may 
indirectly serve the value of participation, by freeing up time and attention for more 
resource-intensive complaints. As informants described it, however, procedural 
flexibility also directly serves participation and legitimacy by promoting voice and 
inclusion of all parties. Informants believed it would be costly to legitimacy, 
destructive to community relations, or corrosive to the durability of a resolution if 
processes exclude stakeholders beyond the subject and investigators—as in the 
examples involving tribal leadership, community-based organization, school 
boards, or local trusted officials in overseas protocols. The procedural flexibility 
embedded in these ADR systems allow for the involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders on a case-by-case basis, which informants commonly described as a 
                                                 
Flexibility, however, serves several key values in the IDR process, as this Section suggests. 
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procedural goal. As one informant noted: 
Each situation almost is unique . . . . And the biggest principle that 
we try to follow that’s sort of a general principle . . . is to spend a 
lot of time being absolutely certain that we have consulted with 
all the appropriate parties . . . . And that means at information 
gathering, identification of an appropriate, uh, resolution and 
action plan, and then conducting and carrying out that action plan, 
and then closing the loop when the whole thing is done. So that’s 
kind of the general principle that we do that is common to all the 
complaints . . . because we’ve had some real problems when that 
didn’t happen. 
Many informants stressed that a standardized process would be inadequate to 
handle complaints, and some believed that the interpersonal skills of the dispute 
processors are likely more important for a thorough resolution, compared to the 
process elements itself. 
These complaints are as variable as there are people . . . . I’m 
wondering if you could or whoever develops this could come up 
with enough of a cookbook or a recipe, um, that it’s going to be 
applicable to the next five cases that came in the door . . . . Some 
of it depends on who you have handling [complaints], just how 
adept they are at dealing with people, um, more than 
processes . . . . I don’t know that this is going to be an area that 
just immediately lends itself to here’s, here’s, here’s the one 
template or recipe you can all follow and apply this to every 
complaint you get 
But despite the virtues of procedural flexibility, informants also noted that a 
flexible process introduced complexity, unpredictability, bias, and difficulty in 
passing on institutional knowledge. Informants noted that flexibility may lead to a 
lack of transparency and inconsistency. 
I think a strength is our flexibility or the nuances. I mean, I enjoy 
the autonomy to handle these things in the, uh, in a professional 
expeditious manner, as I see fit given the nature of them. But I 
also see, particularly as like a noncompliance gets tied in with this, 
the fact that we don’t have, if you will, very transparent, codified, 
step by step procedures that we follow every single time can bite 
us. 
The flexibility is the upside and it’s the downside . . . . It means 
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that I am making decisions . . . . And that’s my job . . . . But I have 
to decide, you know, pretty quickly what the correct response is 
and who to contact and where to go with it . . . . So having that, 
um, in the hands of a, a single individual . . . almost always it’s, 
it’s a single individual who’s handling it and that, I think, might 
be, that could be a problem. 
Informants also noted that the embedded discretion for IRBs to select among 
processes can also make it difficult to train successors in the process more 
generally, which could lead to inconsistency over time. 
One doesn’t really know if there’s a right or wrong way of dealing 
with this. You just do whatever makes sense for the 
participant . . . . [There’s] a lot of flexibility. And a lot of 
discretion. Uh, it’s up to the discretion of, um, me for the most 
part. That’s -- that’s the problem . . . . [It’s] not impossible [to 
train someone else]. The challenge is that, um, it’s a subjective 
process that depends on my view of what’s going on initially . . . . 
it would be difficult to document, if necessary the triage process, 
because that is based on, largely on subjectivity and intuition and 
a lot of intangible characteristics. 
Informants therefore viewed the deliberate exercise of procedural flexibility 
as a means of serving participation and legitimacy values, as well as the more 
proximate goal of system efficiency. But flexibility was not an unabated good, and 
it complicated values such as procedural predictability and equality, as well as the 
proximate goals of consistency and system transparency. The following section 
will consider informants’ appraisals of process goals and values more generally. 
IV. APPRAISING IRB-MANAGED IDR SYSTEMS 
Apart from asking informants to describe their procedures, the interviews also 
asked informants to appraise the strengths and weaknesses of their complaint 
resolution systems. Informants identified a number of strengths, including the 
contributions of procedural flexibility. But informants also noted problems from 
their perspectives, including concerns about low uptake, the capacity of the IRB to 
act as a third-party neutral, frustration with available resources, and the potential 
for inconsistency across participants or time. 
This Article now moves from a descriptive to normative view to provide a 
critical appraisal of IRBs’ IDR systems. Strengths include the ability of these 
processes to consider both rights and interests, as well as the voluntary nature of 
participation and the continued access to litigation where participants choose to 
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file claims. But among system weaknesses, I echo some of the informants’ 
concerns, focusing more specifically on participant non-consultation, low uptake, 
and IRBs’ institutional capacities to behave neutrally and skillfully in the dispute 
resolution role. This Part will first describe informants’ appraisals, followed by my 
own. 
A. Informants’ Appraisals 
Beyond the strengths afforded by procedural flexibility, informants described 
many other advantages of their complaint resolution processes. The institutions 
that compensated subjects who sustained research-related injuries—either by 
institutional insurance or by de facto provision of medical treatment—viewed the 
availability of a financial remedy as a particular strength. (In contrast, institutions 
with “fuzzy” language on injuries or policies of nonpayment were a source of great 
frustration to informants, who would prefer to have the option to make subjects 
whole for physical injuries.) Many informants noted that their process functions 
well to give both subjects and investigators the opportunity to be heard and 
respected, and those with a written or standardized process were more likely to 
describe consistency and transparency as system strengths. The personal qualities 
of individuals involved in the process—such as substantive knowledge of the 
regulations, experience handling complaints and investigators, personal 
experience in the investigator role, interpersonal or counseling skills, and 
(sometimes) dispute resolution training—were also viewed as strengths. 
Informants appraised decision quality in terms of accuracy about facts, finality and 
non-recurrence of the dispute, parties’ satisfaction, and the ability to enact system-
level change for disputes that indicate a systemic problem. Most institutions 
believed their processes functioned well on these measures, and believed that they 
had struck the best possible balance between protecting participants, treating 
investigators fairly, and safeguarding the interests of the institution. 
1. Access and Uptake 
Despite the perceived strengths of their processes, informants believed the 
frequency of complaints was surprising low, and many were puzzled by the 
shortage. As one informant said, “I’ve always felt that the number of complaints 
we get is remarkably small for the size of our research operation . . . . The 
information [about our IRB] is really prominent in our consent forms, but . . . it 
just seems odd to me, um, that we don’t have more.” Informants who sought to 
explain this shortage of complaints offered different explanations for the scarcity. 
Some noted that research staff are likely the first port of call for a subject 
complaint, and these informants emphasized the need for IRBs to train 
investigators and staff to respond thoroughly to subject concerns. Several 
49
Underhill: Righting Research Wrongs: An Empirical Study of How U.S. Institut
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
RIGHTING RESEARCH WRONGS 
105 
institutions that primarily conducted social and behavioral research suggested that 
complaints are infrequent because their research portfolio tended to be minimal 
risk, or excluded clinical trials. One research hospital informant noted that 
complaints are likely low because all hospital patients know they are receiving 
research-related services, giving them a different set of expectations about their 
care. Others suggested that participants enrolled in therapeutic research are less 
likely to complain, compared to healthy individuals who participate in research for 
financial reasons and may have more complaints related to compensation. 
But as interviews continued, many informants suggested that research 
participants may be unable or unwilling to call the IRBs with complaints. 
Participants may not understand research protocols, making it difficult for them to 
form expectations – and thus, difficult to identify when they have experienced a 
wrong. Even if participants are aware that the IRB provides a venue for dispute 
resolution, they may be fearful of the consequences of complaining. Subjects 
enrolled in ongoing protocols or clinical care may also fear retaliation or stigma 
after lodging a complaint. 
It’s probably the tip of the iceberg underneath that one [complaint] 
in two years is people that were frustrated and wanted to complain 
but they talked themselves out of it . . . I think there’s some stigma 
attached to, um, calling up somebody that works for the 
university . . . I think the person would be uncomfortable to call 
the university. 
We have a low number, and I’d like to think that’s because 
everyone’s so excellent at what they do . . . . [But] I fear that 
sometimes there’s people that might want to share something or 
talk through something, and they don’t share because . . . [they] 
are also patients . . . and the research study might even be headed 
by the person who also provides their clinical care . . . . We 
definitely try to set up a system of being anonymous and we keep 
them separated from the investigator and all that good stuff, but 
even with all those protections I feel people might hesitate to say, 
or they might not even be sure what to complain about. You know 
what I mean, they’re not always 100% positive of how a consent 
process should really be executed. Did they have enough time to 
think through it and ask their questions? They might not even feel 
confident, if they’ve had a bad experience, that they had a bad 
experience. I’m always very surprised that we have the small 
number that we do. 
Sometimes the researcher is also their physician that they have 
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known for years and maybe the complaint is about some aspect of 
the study, but they don’t want to sour the relationship that they’ve 
had with a certain specialist or something like that. 
Finally, informants also noted that subjects may be uncertain about the process 
for dispute resolution, and this uncertainty may make the process inaccessible. 
Although the consent forms consistently directed participants to the IRBs, 
informants expressed concern that this information was not prominent or clear 
enough to empower subjects to use the system. 
I’m sort of surprised that more people don’t call us or ask 
questions . . . I just think people don’t necessarily think to call us, 
you know? . . . . I’ve often thought maybe we should, it would be 
interesting to do a study about putting the IRB’s phone number 
first on the consent form to see if we got more calls. Because I 
think with that many protocols . . . I think we’d have more calls. 
I think that people probably don’t report it enough, and I don’t 
know if that has to do with, maybe perception of research 
compliance, or if our participants really are just not aware that 
they can report . . . . I definitely think that there has been . . . some 
instances where a student or participant could complaint, but they 
just don’t . . . because they just brush it off, or because they, you 
know, are really not aware of the procedure, or if they just don’t 
understand the importance of reporting. 
Some may argue that low uptake of a complaint resolution is appropriate for 
research-related complaints; in a setting where many complaints may entail non-
justiciable or minor harms, lumping the complaint or exiting the relationship123 
may be more efficient for many subjects and institutions. Institutions certainly 
benefit from the comparatively low administrative costs of a seldom-used 
complaint procedure. But the low frequency of complaints may be problematic in 
this context for several instrumental reasons, even without considering inherent 
value of dispute resolution for subjects. First, silence on minor complaints obscure 
systemic problems that eventually expose institutions to significant legal risks, 
such as deficiencies in informed consent procedures. Second, dissatisfied subjects 
who feel they must lump their disputes can contribute to difficult relationships 
between institutions and their surrounding communities, which can spill over into 
other conflicts. Third, when subjects choose to exit scientific research or decline 
                                                 
 123 Jost, supra note 29, at 314; William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on 
Dispute Processing, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 63, 81 (1974). 
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to reenroll in future protocols, the institution must divert more resources to study 
recruitment and retention, thus increasing the costs of research and reducing the 
feasibility of human subjects protocols. The disproportionately low frequency of 
complaints, therefore, may not be fully in institutions’ best interests at present. 
Fully explaining the low uptake of institutions’ dispute resolution processes 
requires more research with participants themselves, in order to explore 
perceptions of research experiences that give rise to complaints, their awareness of 
the availability and content of a complaint resolution process, and their 
expectations and perceptions of these institutionally controlled ADR systems. But 
my research with the designers and implementers of IRBs’ processes suggests that 
research subjects do not receive sufficient information to make the complaint 
resolution process accessible—perhaps because they do not understand or believe 
that they have grounds to complain, because they are unaware of the forum, or 
because they are unaware of the procedural safeguards the forum provides. And 
moreover, even if participants are aware of mistreatment and the venue for 
complaint resolution, they may nonetheless be deterred by fears that complaining 
will result in stigma, retaliation, deterioration of relationships with care providers, 
or loss of access to services. The low uptake of these processes suggests that many 
subjects do not currently view them as meaningful options for complaint 
resolution. 
2. Neutrality 
Despite agreeing that IRBs had authority to resolve disputes, some informants 
expressed discomfort with placing the IRB in the role of a neutral third party. The 
most visible stakeholders in complaints are the subject and the investigator, but 
complaints also implicate the institution, the broader communities of which 
subjects are a part, and the legitimacy and progress of science as a greater social 
good. The federal regulations task IRBs with protecting subject welfare, and some 
informants suggested that this biased their judgments to favor subjects. As one 
noted, “Because of the way the staff then would view their roles here . . . they’re 
more participant, uh, oriented. And I always just have to point out to them . . . you 
need to give the investigator an equal chance.” Another concurred: “I do think we 
need to remain neutral though in before until we get all of the facts . . . . But our 
end and ultimate goal is to protect the rights um of the participant to make sure 
they are treated correctly.” Some informants even suggested that placing 
participants first was the best way to serve institutional interests: “I have to follow 
the regulations to protect the institution, as well as to protect the participant . . . in 
that way they’re kind of woven together . . . . follow the regulations, be accurate, 
and honor the subject’s complaint.” 
But some informants also noted that ties to investigators and institutions can 
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complicate these loyalties. As one reflected, “You’re here as an IRB staff. You 
need to work for the subject. You you’re protecting the subject, not the PI . . . . But 
the PI is a colleague . . . . So you need to have balance between both discussions.” 
As institutional dispute resolution scholars would note, IRBs are institutional arms, 
staffed by institutional employees, and IRB professionals are aware of their role in 
protecting their institution throughout the complaint resolution process. As one 
informant noted, “I think [neutrality] is important, but I think it’s very difficult to 
achieve . . . for us to be impartial . . . . I do think we’re biased toward the institution 
because of our employment status.” Or as another noted, “The first, you know, line 
of protection needs to be the participants but . . . as university officials there’s a, a 
responsibility to the university as well.” The burden of neutrality and pressure from 
the institution can make these dispute resolution processes highly stressful for IRB 
personnel, as one informant described: 
When our office has to engage in a very kind of intense uh 
investigation and follow up for a complaint . . . it’s pretty stressful 
on our resources and on our personnel. There have definitely been 
times when we have uh feared for our safety because an 
investigator feels their um their career is on the line, and when the 
institution feels that you know their reputation is on the line. And 
[when] we’re trying to pursue um you know an investigation that 
may have some implications for the institution . . . we might feel 
our job is in jeopardy . . . . It’s personally very stressful . . . . 
We’ve been . . . trying to understand the reasons for burnout and 
turnover . . . in our office. And any compliance office I think, um, 
has similar issues because it’s just the nature of this kind of work, 
compliance work . . . our turnover is pretty high . . . . Our biggest 
weakness is dealing with institutional oversight, and kind of being 
able to make our determinations in an autonomous way.  
These concerns did not arise in all institutions; some informants reported little 
difficulty viewing their role as a third-party neutral. As one informant said, “I’m 
not representing or defending the role of the investigator or any institution, that 
I’m neutral because our goal . . . our goal is human subject protection and that 
[resolving disputes is] part, it’s part of it so [I’m] definitely neutral.” But it is 
important to note that neutrality may not be perfectly secured through an internal 
process, and IRBs are aware of these tensions. 
3. Resources and Training 
In part due to the rarity of participant complaints, many informants noted that 
they had not received extensive training or professional development to handle 
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disputes directly. A small minority of informants had completed complaint 
resolution or mediation training, but they had done so for other purposes, such as 
institution-wide HR initiatives or training for previous employment. Although 
many informants noted that they felt comfortable handling most subject complaints 
due to their institutional mandate to protect participants, they also reported 
uncertainty about how to manage complaints that may involve mental illness, 
threats of violence, and volatile interpersonal dynamics. When asked what 
resources could improve their processes, informants were most likely to mention 
the need for dispute resolution skills building, mediation training, or counseling 
training throughout the IRB office. 
Informants sometimes noted struggling with the manpower and time needed 
to handle complex complaints, particularly given other IRB functions such as 
initial and ongoing protocol review. Multiple institutions also reported difficulties 
documenting complaints in a helpful way, and as noted, most did not document 
complaints in a manner that would allow for systematic analysis over time. Again, 
many described this as the result of rare complaints, since there may not be enough 
for a helpful analysis of systemic problems. As one informant noted, “I would be 
interested in a little more formal feedback loop . . . if we had data that would show 
if . . . there’s a lot of complaints in a certain area then we could increase, redirect 
our education program . . . . It would be, you know, allocation of resources to 
prevent [problems].” 
Informants also reported having little or no information about other 
institutions’ processes, making it difficult to appraise and improve their systems. 
This arises in part from the nonpublic nature of these ADR systems, but also from 
a general lack of professional attention because complaints are currently rare. 
Many suggested that PRIM&R, the organization for IRB professionals, could build 
capacity by focusing on this issue in annual conferences or continuing education, 
such as providing case studies or an aggregation of best practices across 
institutions. 
4. Consistency and Monitoring 
As the previous section noted, some informants expressed concerns about 
consistency and predictability. In large part, this reflected the procedural flexibility 
that they viewed as essential to achieving participation and legitimacy goals. But 
many also suggested that the rareness of complaints may undermine consistency, 
since the procedures are not invoked often enough to become routine: “I know that 
we can all improve our processes. It’s one of those areas that we don’t see a lot of 
them . . . since it’s infrequent and it’s, each case is individual, it’s hard to come up 
with, you know, systematic processes.” 
Some also noted that it was difficult to gauge whether their processes were in 
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fact consistent or successful, because they did not have enough complaints to 
assess how the system functioned as a whole. “[The process] hasn’t really been 
tested . . . . with all our policies, even in writing, they were in draft form for quite 
a while. You really don’t know, have you covered everything, until . . . the scenario 
arises and you pull the policy and you’re ready to walk those steps out . . . You 
never know the holes until you find them.” Institutions with larger research 
portfolios with a larger absolute number of complaints are less likely to have this 
problem, but informants from such institutions still noted difficulties with 
documenting complaints in a way that allows them to monitor for consistency and 
systemic problems. 
B. A Critical Appraisal of IDR Processes 
Taken as a whole, this study has revealed a set of institutional dispute 
resolution systems with broad procedural flexibility, institutional discretion, and 
management by institutional employees who perceive an ethical and regulatory 
imperative to protect subjects—but who also note conflicting loyalties to 
investigators and the institution as a whole. The system design typically matches 
the priority that informants placed on values of participation, revelation, and 
privacy; subjects and investigators have a full opportunity to communicate facts, 
these parties have some opportunities to shape the process and remedy, the system 
accommodates both justiciable and non-justiciable claims, decisions are reasoned 
and almost always written, decisions are enforceable within the scope of IRBs’ 
regulatory authority, and the systems aim for party satisfaction as a primary 
proximate goal. To the extent that participation directly shapes party acceptance of 
the system, the processes serve legitimacy values as well, both for parties and the 
broader project of scientific advancement. 
In relation to a recent framework of preferred design elements for ADR 
systems,124 these systems also have several key strengths: they offer multiple 
process options (e.g., facilitated negotiation, quasi-arbitration), and accommodate 
both interests and legal rights. They provide flexibility for complaining subjects to 
have input on the process, although the processes made little distinction between 
rights and interests. Participation is voluntary and confidential for subjects 
(although less voluntary for investigators, who are subject to IRB authority), and 
the system aimed for transparency of process while parties were engaged in the 
dispute. Parties may also pursue litigation even after the conclusion of these IDR 
processes, in most cases. 
Despite these advantages, this case study also reveals several key deficiencies 
of the systems. This Section will consider three problems in particular: (1) lack of 
participant input on system design; (2) potential underutilization; and (3) 
                                                 
 124 Smith & Martinez, supra note 27, at 128. 
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challenges to IRB neutrality and resources for dispute resolution. This Part will 
conclude with a set of recommendations to improve on existing practices. 
1. Exclusion of Participants from System Design 
The origins of IRBs’ IDR systems are largely stories of “muddling 
through.”125 Across all institutions, IDR processes arose informally as a set of 
departmental practices when IRBs responded to unexpected complaints, and those 
practices were responsive to institutional resources and IRBs’ perceived role. At 
some institutions, practices for complaint resolution remain informal, and even 
unwritten. Other institutions have codified their practices, but most did not do so 
until prompted by the AAHRPP accreditation process. Where IRBs consulted 
external resources during process development, they were likely to ask other IRBs 
for guidance, rather than developing a new process with input from institutional 
and external stakeholders. IRBs typically described small modifications over time 
in response to institutional constraints and learning, but few to none had 
undertaken a wholesale examination of their complaint resolution practices. As 
noted above, AAHRPP requires a written policy for the resolution of complaints, 
but does not set requirements for how these systems are designed and operated. 
In light of these origins, all the IDR systems in this Article were uniformly 
designed without the input of participant representatives. Literature on dispute 
system design emphasizes the importance of involving all stakeholders—all those 
who are “affected either by the problem/conflict or by a potential solution.”126 This 
can allow dispute system designers to account for parties’ interests in process 
design, and to build in elements of procedural justice from the earliest 
opportunity.127 The informal nature of procedure development clarifies why this 
has not happened, but it is plausible, ethical, and practical for IRBs to remedy the 
issue when there is an opportunity to reconsider their current policies. 
Two factors may mitigate the exclusion of participants from the development 
of these IDR processes, but these are incomplete remedies for non-consultation. 
First, some might classify the IRB itself as a participant representative—it is, after 
all, bound to ensure the protection of research subjects. But IRBs are composed of 
members who are dissimilar, in most ways, from research participants. Per the 
Common Rule, IRBs must include at least five members “with varying 
backgrounds,” with efforts made to avoid discrimination by race and gender, and 
must include at least one scientist, one nonscientist, someone from outside the 
                                                 
 125 See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 
(1959). 
 126 NANCY H. RODGERS, ROBERT C. BORDONE, FRANK E.A. SANDER & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, 
DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES 72 (2013). 
 127 Id. at 75. 
56
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 18 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol18/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 18:1 (2018) 
112 
institution, and someone knowledgeable about applicable laws and standards of 
professional practice.128 IRBs reviewing research with vulnerable populations 
(e.g., children, pregnant women, prisoners, people with mental disabilities) must 
also include individuals who are “knowledgeable” and “experienced” in working 
with these groups.129 Experience in working with subjects, however, does not mean 
that IRBs understand how participants may experience research complaints, nor 
how they would prefer to seek redress at the institution. Moreover, many IDR 
procedures have developed within IRB administrative offices, rather than being 
considered by the full IRB. 
Secondly, IRBs give participants some say over procedural options, such as 
electing anonymity, choosing between mediation or an arbitration-like process, or 
bringing disputes to a trusted local authority for protocols that have provided that 
choice. Giving participants choices at the time of the dispute alleviates the problem 
of non-consultation at the outset. But participant feedback is nonetheless important 
at the time of system design. Having a say in process development is important in 
part as a matter of procedural justice, but also as a matter of improving system 
accessibility, the durability of resolutions, and perceived legitimacy of the process 
(and the research institution more generally). 
Consulting participant groups is daunting and complex. Institutions have 
enormous research portfolios, and it is impossible to consult a representative from 
every participant constituency. Research changes over time, and current 
participants may not be well-placed to represent future participants’ needs. The 
difficulty of incorporating participant perspectives may be one reason why these 
views are so frequently omitted from general discussions of research ethics.130 Part 
V will consider potential pragmatic strategies for soliciting participants’ views of 
the dispute resolution system, as well as outcomes that IRBs should consider in 
evaluating whether system changes have led to improvement.131 
2. Process Underutilization 
It is difficult to know what an “optimal” number of participant complaints 
may be. We do not know the frequency of actual or experienced misconduct in 
research, nor do we know the frequency of physical injury. Moreover, we do not 
know the number of complaints that participants would deem sufficiently serious 
to seek resolution, rather than lumping or dismissing the problem. Of this number, 
we also do not know how many complaints are already addressed by investigators 
and their staffs, without escalating to the level of an IRB report. If the number of 
                                                 
 128 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2018). 
 129 Id. 
 130 DRESSER, supra note 11. 
 131 See Section V.A. 
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complaints made to IRBs rose sharply, it may be practically impossible for existing 
institutions to resolve each complaint with the full complement of processes 
described here—intake, consultation, fact-finding, deliberation, decision, and 
appeal. Substituting an abbreviated process for the sake of inefficiency could 
disadvantage complainants with more complex grievances; at the other end of the 
spectrum, scaling up dispute resolution resources to handle large numbers of 
complaints may divert resources that are currently used for other ends, such as 
medical treatment or research expenses. Without knowing the number of 
complaints that participants may have in aggregate—including those never 
brought to the IRB’s attention—it is difficult if not impossible to measure 
important system outcomes such as participant access and uptake. 
It is possible to argue that the number of complaints currently received by IRB 
dispute resolution systems is in fact optimal. But almost all the informants in this 
study believed that their processes were underutilized. Prior research on participant 
comprehension of research protocols at the time of informed consent suggests that 
there are frequent disparities between participants’ expectations and the reality of 
clinical trials.132 For example, research on the “therapeutic misconception” and 
“preventive misconception” shows that as much as 62% of participants may be 
expected to believe that medications are effective or have “unrealistic beliefs” 
about the likelihood of benefit, when those drugs are in fact unproven.133 This is 
one example of experiences that may not match expectations; many other surprises 
and misadventures are possible. The numbers in Table 2 may also give us pause to 
reconsider utilization; a median complaint frequency of 2.2 per 1,000 protocols 
(which enroll far more than 1,000 subjects!) seems far lower than what might be 
expected. 
Considering these facts, it is reasonable to believe that utilization of these IDR 
programs is low. Although low uptake may be immediately advantageous for 
institutions with limited human resources on their IRBs, leaving research-related 
disputes unresolved can expose research institutions to adverse consequences such 
as future litigation, future media exposure, poor reputation, and increased costs of 
future research. 
Some of the causes of low system uptake may be difficult to remedy in health 
care systems that merge therapeutic research with clinical care. Subjects may not 
wish to jeopardize their care relationships by complaining about studies conducted 
                                                 
 132 See Flory & Emanuel, supra note 7, at 1593 (citing studies, including one showing that 30% 
of participants in cancer trials believed that they were receiving a treatment already proven to be the 
best for their cancer). 
 133 Paul Appelbaum et al., Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and 
Risk Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1 (2004); Charles W. Lidz et al., Therapeutic 
Misconception and the Appreciation of Risks in Clinical Trials, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1689 (2004); 
Alan E. Simon et al., Preventive Misconception: Its Nature, Presence, and Ethical Implications for 
Research, 32 AM. J. PREV. MED. 370 (2007). 
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by their own clinicians. Subjects in all institutions and all types of protocols may 
also be skeptical of the neutrality of any forum offered by the institution, including 
the IRB itself, and past research abuses have created a legacy of institutional 
mistrust in many communities. The dispute resolution systems in this case study 
were designed exclusively by the institutions, and although subjects could select 
their desired level of involvement in the process, the institutions did not consult 
subjects or subject groups during the initial design stage. These barriers may persist 
regardless of dispute system design, even with an external third-party neutral and 
advance notice of procedural protections such as the ability to remain anonymous. 
But low uptake also reflects a lack of information, particularly lack of 
awareness of the forum and the process for dispute resolution, and systems can 
seek to remedy these problems by better educating subjects during study 
enrollment and follow-up. Subjects’ awareness and understanding of protocols and 
“subjects’ rights”—and thus, their expectations of how they should be treated—
will inform whether they recognize wrongs as actionable. More effective education 
about protocol design and clear enunciation of other interests—such as a right to 
be treated with dignity during the study, or a right to voice concerns about study 
processes—may help. The low uptake almost certainly reflects low subject 
awareness of IRB oversight, authority over studies, and availability to resolve 
subject complaints. 
Where subjects do understand that a forum exists for the resolution of their 
complaints, they currently have no way of knowing what will happen when they 
contact that forum. IRBs do not provide advance notice of procedural protections 
such as anonymity or confidentiality, nor are subjects aware of how the IRB will 
proceed to address their concerns. Because procedures are so flexible, written 
processes may be imprecise or absent, and they are not made available to potential 
subjects in detail. Subjects do not know in advance, for example, that facilitated 
negotiation is available, that the IRB makes decisions independent of the research 
team, or that complaints can sometimes lead to changes in institutional policies 
that may benefit future subjects. A lack of information about the process, which in 
part derives from broad procedural flexibility, may undermine predictability and 
subjects’ perception of control over their complaints. 
3. IRB Neutrality and Capacity 
As noted throughout this Article, IRBs have several interests that come into 
conflict when they manage research-related disputes. IRBs are required to 
prioritize subject welfare (which may disadvantage researchers); they are 
colleagues of researchers who are repeat players in IRB review (which may 
disadvantage participants); and they are also members of the institution and aware 
of institutional interests. Furthermore, IRBs who oversee disputes are also the very 
59
Underhill: Righting Research Wrongs: An Empirical Study of How U.S. Institut
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
RIGHTING RESEARCH WRONGS 
115 
institutional representatives who initially approved study protocols to proceed. If 
disputes escalate to litigation, IRBs themselves may be liable for negligent 
protocol approval and oversight,134 giving them a direct stake in resolving disputes 
quickly and with minimal institutional exposure. A participant complaint about 
study procedures may also be viewed as a challenge to IRBs’ original 
determination that the procedures were ethical, which asks IRBs to revisit these 
initial judgments at the moment of the complaint. This could compromise equality 
and accountability, despite IRBs’ regulatory role and sincere commitment to the 
interests of the subject. A long history of scholarship vacillates between two poles: 
some characterize IRBs as intrusive and stifling to researchers,135 while others have 
viewed IRBs as insufficiently protective, overworked, and vulnerable to capture 
by researchers.136 From the view of IRB personnel themselves, this study suggests 
sincere efforts at neutrality, but informants acknowledged that multiple interests—
and the salience of institutional interests in particular—made this challenging. 
The lack of neutrality of a third-party decision-maker can be inimical to all 
process values in dispute resolution,137 including participation, accountability, and 
legitimacy. Participants skeptical of neutrality may decline to use IDR processes, 
or they may disengage if their experience with the process does not fulfill their 
expectations of fairness. Neutrality problems can also impair accountability if the 
decision-maker favors one disputing party, either due to conscious or unconscious 
bias. A lack of neutrality can also impair legitimacy, if disputing parties do not 
accept the process or the outcome as fair; this can challenge the durability of 
resolutions and lead to more disengagement from the process over time. 
Importantly, however, although these are potential problems, we do not have 
evidence yet that they are occurring. The study in this Article conducted interviews 
with IRBs themselves, rather than disputing parties. The broader literature on 
complaints in human subjects research is also thin, and although there are many 
records of researcher discontent with IRB decisions (particularly on protocol 
approval and disapprovals), there is little evidence specific to the participant 
complaint context. 
There are also compelling advantages to using IRBs to manage research-
related disputes. IRBs have enforceable authority to suspend research protocols, to 
require revisions or remedies internal to research protocols, or to cancel protocols 
                                                 
 134 Mello et al., supra note 19. 
 135 Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
271 (2004); Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 405 (2007). 
 136 Hazel Glenn Beh, The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protecting Human Subjects: 
Are We Really Ready To Fix a Broken System?, 26 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2002); Donna Shalala, 
Protecting Research Subjects – What Must Be Done, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 808 (2000); Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants Research: Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform 
Proposals, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 282 (2004). 
 137 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37. 
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entirely, IRBs already have the scientific expertise to understand protocols and 
potential deviations, and they are familiar with each of the protocols from which 
disputes arise. IRBs’ regulatory role may partially mitigate the lack of neutrality 
from the participant perspective (although not from the researcher perspective). 
IRBs within the institution can quickly mobilize other institutional actors, such as 
department chairs, legal counsel, human resources, and compliance departments 
that may assist in fact-finding. Moreover, there institutional role as the guardian of 
participant welfare means that IRBs should be involved, somehow, in any IDR 
process for research-related disputes. In light of the low frequency of complaints, 
institutions may also find it inefficient to invest in a separate IDR process for 
research-related disputes. 
The balance of advantages and disadvantages shifted somewhat in multi-site 
studies under the 2018 revisions to the Common Rule, which requires that multi-
site studies use a single IRB of record.138 For these studies, the IRB that approved 
the study may be at a different institution from where the complaint arises. 
Presumably, these studies could refer complaints either to the local IRB at their 
site, or to the IRB of record. Local IRB may be somewhat less familiar with study 
procedures, but they may also have less concern for their own interest (in the event 
that the dispute escalates to litigation involving the approving IRB). Referring all 
complaints to the IRB of record presents other advantages, such as familiarity with 
the protocol and potentially less concern about liability of their own research 
institution. The revised Common Rule does not specify how complaints or injuries 
arising from such study should be resolved, leaving this an open question.139 
Without evidence of current harm, and given the structural advantages of 
using IRBs for resolving research-related complaints, it is sensible to leave these 
dispute resolution processes within the IRB. But this raises questions of 
institutional support and IRB training for dispute resolution tasks. Informants in 
this study described burdens in implementing the IDR process, including 
substantial human resources, time necessary for deliberation on both process and 
outcome, emotional strain and fatigue, and a lack of skills training in relevant areas 
such as mediation or conflict resolution. IRBs are already (and have long been) 
overtaxed in time and resources, and they navigate an increasingly complex set of 
federal, state, and institutional policies. Particularly if the number of complaints 
were to increase, IRBs currently lack some expertise and resources needed for an 
effective response to complex or emotionally fraught complaints. 
This discussion raises the question of IRBs’ capacity and motivation to make 
changes to their IDR systems. To that end, IRBs have some advantages that make 
                                                 
 138 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017); 45 C.F.R. § 46.114(b)(1) (2018). 
 139 Stark & Greene, Clinical Trials, supra note 72 (noting that centralized IRB review raises 
questions about allocating institutional liability). 
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them well-positioned to improve these processes. Human research protection 
programs are fairly small and self-contained within their institutions, and they have 
a great deal of discretion over their internal procedures and their interpretations of 
federal regulations. IRBs or the heads of human research protection programs often 
report directly to institutional presidents or vice presidents for research, and IRBs’ 
independent federal mandate to protect research participants gives them a separate 
source of authority to make changes that they deem necessary for that goal. IRB 
chairs and administrative staff are extremely well educated, as noted in this study, 
and they are attentive to their federal mandate, as this study has suggested. The 
informants in this study often expressed the motivation to improve their processes, 
including asking about other institutions’ best practices, and many noted that this 
was the first time they had the opportunity to reflect on this institutional function. 
In their institutional capacity, moreover, these informants had power to make or 
credibly suggest changes to existing policies. It appears, therefore, that there would 
be high capacity and perhaps high motivation to change these systems given 
awareness of the need. But to date, IRBs have experienced a low frequency of 
complaints, creating few opportunities to reconsider their processes or to evaluate 
their effectiveness. IRBs also may lack the time, financial resources, and 
manpower to study this issue or to make resource-intensive changes. Some of the 
suggestions below, such as compensating injured participants, may be beyond the 
power of the IRB, and more properly suggested to institutional presidents or 
general counsels. But where changes are inexpensive and fairly straightforward, 
there is good reason for optimism about IRBs’ capacity and motivation to improve 
their IDR processes. 
V. IMPROVING IDR FOR RESEARCH-RELATED INJURIES 
The previous Part describes a number of drawbacks of current IDR processes 
for resolving research-related disputes. This Part will conclude with 
recommendations for improving the functioning and fairness of these dispute 
resolution systems. 
As noted above, I stop short of recommending that these IDR systems be 
relocated outside the IRB. To be sure, the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the FDA could require the use of a neutral third-party mediator or 
arbitrator through the federal regulations governing human subjects research. This 
could also be achieved by federal or state statute, by professional accreditation 
standards set by AAHRPP, or by changes in institution-level policies. But the costs 
of this choice may well outweigh the gains for most disputes, particularly those 
that do not allege physical injury or a legal claim against the institution (and even 
for these claims, the use of a neutral third party may still pose the problem of the 
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institution as a repeat player).140 The structural advantages of having IRBs 
involved in dispute resolution for research-related injuries are great, and although 
non-neutrality is problematic, it is inherent to all IDR systems, and it is partially 
offset (from the subject perspective) by the IRB mandate to protect subjects. 
Imposing the requirement of a third-party neutral from outside the institution 
would also scale up the costs of disputes and could impose inefficient levels of 
process for minor complaints. Requiring subjects to bear these costs would impair 
access to the forum, as most subjects would be unable or unwilling to pay. 
Institutions could bear the costs, but this may impair neutrality of the forum for 
third-party decision-makers that were repeatedly retained. Requiring research 
sponsors to bear the costs would increase the expense of research more generally, 
posing tradeoffs between paying for more research or more administrative costs. 
I will also stop short of recommending changes to the Common Rule to 
structure or constrain IDR as implemented by IRBs. This is for a similar reason; 
although we now have evidence from IRBs about how their processes currently 
work, including some likely deficiencies, we do not have systemic evidence that 
these deficiencies are experienced by subjects or researchers as harmful. IRBs 
described uses of procedural flexibility in order to promote participant priorities, 
such as voice and access. Mandating and monitoring IRB compliance with new 
regulatory requirements for complaint resolution, especially when the frequency 
of complaints may be low, is likely to increase inefficiencies in the current system. 
It may also discourage innovation, such as institutions that began using local 
trusted authorities in culturally or linguistically distinct participant populations to 
assist in handling disputes. Changing federal regulations may also not be necessary 
to improve IDR practices in IRBs; there are numerous examples of internal 
changes in IRBs that did not require a regulatory nudge.141 Interviews with these 
informants suggested that many institutions were open to guidance and an 
opportunity to revisit their IDR procedures, and the informal nature of many of 
these IDR systems may facilitate the incorporation of new ideas without a 
regulatory requirement. 
A. Consult Research Participants During System Design 
First, IRBs should make efforts to consult participants at the moment of 
system design, or during periodic reevaluation of procedures. As noted above, this 
is not entirely straightforward, given that institutions often have many thousands 
of research portfolios representing a large number of different participant groups. 
As a practical matter, consultation of participants’ perspectives on dispute 
system design could either occur on a protocol-by-protocol basis or at the level of 
                                                 
 140 Galanter, supra note 12. 
 141 Stark, Victims, supra note 72 (citing examples). 
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the IRB. On a per-protocol basis, IRBs could ask researchers to consult with 
representatives from participants or the larger community—such as through the 
use of a community advisory board142—to ascertain participant preferences for 
dispute resolution in the individual study. Or similarly, IRBs could ask researchers 
to disclose more information about the dispute resolution process, and to ask for 
informal feedback at the time of informed consent or the conclusion of studies.143 
Researchers could then report this information in aggregate back to the IRB for 
consideration. Another strategy may be for institutions to randomly select a small 
number of ongoing protocols and invite subjects enrolled in these protocols to give 
feedback on the dispute resolution procedure at the time of informed consent. 
At the level of the IRB, the easiest (and least representative) method for 
soliciting feedback on the IDR system would be to ask participants for feedback 
while they are using the process, or perhaps after their issue is resolved. This may 
yield a biased perspective, however, because it will only capture the views of 
participants who have already chosen to use the system in its current form. IRBs 
could collect more representative feedback by soliciting comments from all 
participants in approved protocols at a given point in time—such as by allowing 
anonymous comments through a web portal, using a process akin to notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or a series of public meetings.144 Researchers could 
publicize this comment process to their current research participants. Or IRBs 
could prospectively identify the most common participant populations in their 
approved studies, and conduct focus groups sampling from these groups. This 
would be the most resource-intensive option, however, and it would likely be 
beyond the capacity of most IRBs. 
The opportunity for subject participation in the design of these IDR processes 
may assist in improving access, procedural options, participation, and perceived 
legitimacy of the process. Where comments suggest potential improvements, IRBs 
could make provisional changes to their policies and assess the impact of these 
changes. These impacts should include outcomes such as complaint type and 
frequency, participant satisfaction, perceived legitimacy of the process, 
                                                 
 142 A community advisory board (CAB) is a small group of community stakeholders in a 
research project that provides meaningful input on the design and implementation of a research 
protocol. See, e.g., Stephen F. Morin et al., Community Consultation in HIV Prevention Research: A 
Study of Community Advisory Boards at 6 Research Sites, 33 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY 
SYNDROMES 513 (2003); Sandra Crouse Quinn, Protecting Human Subjects: The Role of Community 
Advisory Boards, 6 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 918 (2004). 
 143 Another strategy would be to require a representative for particular participant groups to be 
on the IRB, as is currently done for research with prisoners, 45 C.F.R. § 46.304(b) (2018)—but this 
may be more burdensome in practice. 
 144 Gathering these data would not count as “research” for IRB purposes, because it is not 
intended to contribute to “generalizable knowledge”—it would be solely for the purposes of 
improving internal operations. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l) (2018). 
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participants’ perception of the institution’s accountability during research, and 
participant awareness of the dispute resolution forum. 
B. Increase Disclosure and Involve Participant Community Leaders 
Second, IRBs should consider a range of other options to increase uptake and 
process utilization by participants. Although as a practical matter, no IRB wants to 
add to its workload, the informants in this study were convinced that low complaint 
frequencies indicated a problem with awareness and access. The remedy for lack 
of awareness is, of course, disclosure. IRBs can publicize their IDR processes on 
their websites, but it would be more useful to disclose more information at the time 
of informed consent. Several issues complicate disclosure. First, when processes 
are highly informal or malleable, there may be no formulate procedure to publicize; 
IRBs may therefore choose to highlight several process options, such as the option 
to make an anonymous complaint or the option of having an IRB staff member 
mediate communication with the investigator. Next, most investigators know little 
about the complaint resolution process, which means that institutions must educate 
not only subjects, but also investigators about this IRB function. Furthermore, 
adding elements to informed consent is not costless. Informed consent forms can 
be long and complex, and recent changes to the Common Rule reflect some of 
these problems.145 Adding information about dispute resolution systems can 
compete for subject attention and extend the duration and complexity of the 
informed consent process. It may also attune participants to the possibility that they 
could be harmed, which could hinder enrollment or increase mistrust. But this is 
unlikely to be a substantial barrier; according to a recent study, even when 
participants are aware of the death of a healthy subject at the same institution, only 
17% said this changed their thoughts about joining research, and only 4% said it 
would change their future participation.146 
None of these drawbacks should hinder greater disclosure of institutions’ 
processes for resolving research-related complaints. Meaningful consent to 
research must be predicated on “essential information that a reasonable person 
would want to know in order to make an informed decision about whether to 
participate”147—and the availability and quality of a forum to resolve research-
related disputes and injuries may be essential for many participants. IRBs could 
potentially improve the effectiveness of these disclosures by asking investigators 
to convey this information verbally. Several reviews of informed consent strategies 
have shown that verbal disclosure and discussion is the most effective means of 
                                                 
 145 80 Fed. Reg. 53970 (Sept. 8, 2015). 
 146 Caitlin E. Kennedy et al., When a Serious Adverse Event in Research Occurs, How Do 
Other Volunteers React?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 47 (2011). 
 147 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017). 
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communicating with research participants,148 and this would be an appropriate and 
efficient means of disclosing subjects’ options in the event that complaints arise. 
Another strategy for increasing process uptake may be to use a practice that 
several institutions have pioneered: asking investigators to identify a trusted 
member of the community to receive complaints and represent participant interests 
in communicating them to the IRB. Several institutions reported using trusted local 
authorities to help process complaints in research with distinctive populations, 
such as Native American tribes. One advantage of this process is that it outsources 
part of the responsibility to investigators to build stronger relationships with local 
subject communities; investigators must identify someone who can be familiar 
with the protocol and accept complaints, and then convey those complaints to the 
investigator or to the IRB. Investigators can then disclose this information to 
subjects as part of the informed consent process. Of course, subjects should keep 
the ability to complain to the IRB directly, in case the trusted local authority is 
unfamiliar or an inappropriate resource for them personally. But this may have 
additional benefits of improving investigators’ engagement with participant 
populations, while also increasing the accessibility of the process to subjects. 
Another variation on this theme may be to add a member of the participant 
population as a temporary consultant to the IRB during deliberations about subject 
complaints arising from that protocol. 
C. Compensate Participants for Physical Injuries 
The informants in the study who expressed the greatest comfort with their IDR 
processes were at institutions that had agreed—either explicitly or as a de facto 
matter—to compensate participants for physical injuries sustained during human 
subjects research. There have been repeated calls and detailed proposals for U.S. 
research institutions to compensate participants for injuries, but this is not yet 
federally required.149 Indeed, the NIH does not compensate participants for 
injuries, and there is no requirement that U.S. research institutions carry insurance 
for this purpose.150 Many institutions had an unwritten practice of compensating 
injured participants, often by providing treatment themselves (e.g., at their own 
hospital) and waiving participant costs or cost-sharing. But nearly half of the 
institutions had a policy of never compensating subjects for physical injury (17%), 
or only compensating subjects when the research funders would agree to it up front 
(30%). 
Compensation policies clearly facilitate dispute resolution of research-related 
complaints. IRB personnel who knew that their institution would ultimately pay 
                                                 
 148 Flory & Emanuel, supra note 7; Nishimura et al., supra note 7. 
 149 Pike, supra note 5; Elliott, supra note 19. 
 150 Id. 
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participants for injuries sustained reported far greater confidence in managing 
disputes, less defensiveness, less concern about institutional liability and 
escalation of the dispute, and a greater sense that the system was operating 
ethically under Belmont Report principles for protecting human subjects. Although 
compensation was rarely if ever offered for non-physical injury, allowing 
compensation in cases of tangible harm was viewed as an essential procedural 
option. Informants at institutions that disallowed payments for injuries noted their 
frustration with this practice, and some commented that they wish their institution 
would institute more flexible policies. 
This Article therefore echoes prior calls for institutions to compensate 
participants for tangible injuries sustained over the course of research, either by 
self-funding or purchasing insurance for this purpose. In addition to the ethical 
rationale for paying for research harms, allowing these payments has a highly 
pragmatic function of facilitating all dispute resolution in this context. 
D. Build IRB Capacity for Conflict Resolution 
The previous Part outlined some of the deficiencies of IRBs in expertise and 
resources for conflict resolution. The remedy is straightforward. In order to 
improve IDR processes—or to continue current processes in the event that process 
uptake increases—research institutions may need to devote additional personnel 
and training to IRB offices, or add administrative staff members who have prior 
training in conflict resolution. Very few of the personnel responsible for resolving 
complaints had training in dispute resolution; approximately 6% were trained as 
J.D.s, but even informants with law degrees noted that they lacked training on the 
interpersonal elements of conflict resolution or ADR. Research institutions could 
help meet these expertise needs by running workshops for IRB personnel—
particularly managers and administrators, rather than members—or by considering 
conflict resolution training during hiring. Another method of increasing this 
expertise is to add modules to the Certified IRB Professional (C.I.P.) course run 
by the Council for Certification of IRB Professionals. More than 50% of 
informants in the study had obtained this qualification, suggesting that training 
modules on conflict management would be a good means of disseminating this 
information. Although AAHRPP accreditation was frequently described as 
complex and somewhat burdensome, an AAHRPP recommendation of having 
conflict resolution training would be another means of encouraging expertise-
building among IRBs. 
Human resources may be another need—again, particularly if the frequency 
of complaints increases. Complex complaints, although rare, were highly resource-
intensive for IRB personnel. Many have called on research institutions to invest 
more in IRBs, and in human resource protection programs more generally, to 
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improve the speed and quality of protocol review. Improving IRB responses to 
participant complaints may be another reason to expand this area of the institution, 
if the frequency or complexity of complaints increases. 
E. Use Records Effectively 
IRBs can also improve their IDR systems through their practices for record-
keeping and systematic examination of those records over time. Many IRBs did 
not record complaints in a manner that would allow for comparison across 
protocols, or over time. Making these comparisons at regular intervals, such as 
one- or two-year periods, could help IRBs identify recurring issues; they could 
address these through investigator training and protocol review instead of 
piecemeal responses to complaints. Creating a way to view complaints together 
would also improve institutional memory and consistency, particularly at times of 
personnel turnover, which may be essential for highly informal processes. IRBs 
are sensitive to local precedent,151 and they may welcome opportunities to ensure 
that their responses to subject issues are consistent over time. 
F. Provide for (Advisory) Third-Party Review 
Instead of requiring the use of a third-party neutral for the initial resolution of 
every complaint, it may be more feasible and efficient to provide for appeals to an 
external reviewer or internal ombudsman to review IRBs’ final decisions about 
complaints. At present, IRBs usually give investigators a written decision once a 
complaint is resolved. Investigators have an opportunity to appeal for 
reconsideration, but IRBs typically do not give or publicize to participants the 
possibility of an appeal. In some ways this lopsided procedure makes intuitive 
sense; IRBs can sanction investigators, but not participants, as part of the 
resolution, so investigators may make more use of this appeal mechanism. But 
from the participant’s perspective, someone dissatisfied with the IRB’s decision 
may feel that they have experienced harm without remedy, and some may want the 
same appeal option to demonstrate that they are being treated equally in the 
process. 
An IRB could, therefore, address both concerns about neutrality and lopsided 
appeals by providing for an independent reviewer, which could be requested by 
the investigator, the participant, or even perhaps by the IRB itself if they seek a 
second opinion or fear institutional interference. This could function similarly to 
the external review mandated by state and federal law for coverage disputes in 
private health insurance, but would likely be far smaller in scope.152 Given IRBs’ 
                                                 
 151 STARK, supra note 72 
 152 Hunter, supra note 32. 
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current goal of subject satisfaction with the process—and their view that most 
participants are in fact satisfied—the uptake (and therefore costs) of this external 
review are likely to be fairly low. Institutions could collaborate with one another 
to develop the infrastructure for this independent reviewer—for example, research 
institutions in each state could contribute to the costs of maintaining an ad hoc 
independent external reviewer for the state or region. When a subject or researcher 
invokes independent review, the IRB would then send the reviewer any reports of 
the complaint investigation and decision for their independent analysis and written 
opinion. 
Although this independent review process may resemble the process of 
external review for health insurance coverage decisions, the process will 
necessarily be weaker. In external review for health insurance coverage disputes, 
the decision of the external review process is binding on the insurance company. 
But for structural reasons, binding external review is complex and likely not viable 
here. The federal regulations delegate authority for research protocol approval, 
disapproval, and oversight to IRBs; the rules specifically provide that research 
“may be subject to further appropriate review and approval or disapproval by 
officials of the institution. However, those officials may not approve the research 
if it has not been approved by an IRB.”153 The Common Rule does not permit 
institutions to delegate this authority outside the IRB (although using an external, 
paid IRB that is subject to federal regulation is permitted). Moreover, if the 
reviewer were an ombudsman within the institution, he or she could require more 
stringent protocol restrictions or termination, but could not lift protocol restrictions 
or reverse a study termination required by the IRB. This would make binding 
review of little use to investigators facing sanctions. Some complaints may also 
raise issues outside the IRB’s purview, such as complaints of investigator 
harassment, which are typically referred to human resources and handled as legal 
matters. 
For this reason, binding review by an independent party, or even binding 
review by an internal ombudsman who is not part of the IRB, is likely unavailable 
here; review will be advisory rather than binding. But even an advisory review of 
IRB decisions would be useful in alleviating concerns about neutrality and the 
inequality of the current appeals process. IRBs will have the opportunity to 
reconsider their findings in light of the third-party reviewer’s recommendation, 
and then to adjust any protocol sanctions or remedies provided. The availability of 
a third-party advisory review may also shape IRBs’ actions even when it is not 
invoked. IRBs that know a third party will evaluate their decision may take greater 
care in their analysis and written decisions, and they may produce (and 
subsequently use) better records of their process. All of these changes may help 
                                                 
 153 45 C.F.R. § 46.112 (2018). 
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produce fairer and more effective decision-making throughout the dispute 
resolution process. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The empirical study in this Article was the first in-depth look at the highly 
flexible systems that research institutions have established to mediate and, at times, 
adjudicate disputes involving human subjects. Disputes in this area are 
characterized in part by high stakes for investigators and institutional exposure to 
liability, but also by disparities in socioeconomic power and sophistication 
between participants and research institutions. Attention to fair process is therefore 
an ethical and practical imperative for functioning systems. At present, 
institutions’ IDR systems take advantage of IRBs’ mandate and authority to protect 
subjects, and IRBs have instituted highly flexible procedures to maximize the 
voice and satisfaction of research subjects who bring grievances. But 
notwithstanding these strengths, IDR systems for research-related complaints also 
pose problems of inclusion, access, neutrality, resources, and expertise. Changes 
to the Common Rule, such as the requirement that multisite studies designate one 
IRB of record, may continue to bring changes to how research-related disputes are 
resolved. 
In light of these findings, this Article has recommended a number of structural 
changes to how IRBs handle research-related grievances. These include 
suggestions for considering participant input on system design; increasing 
publicity and accessibility through informed consent procedures and integration of 
participant community leaders; compensating participants for physical injuries; 
building IRB expertise and resources for conflict resolution; using records to 
identify recurring complaints and improve consistency; and providing for advisory 
third-party review and reconsideration of decisions, even if that review is not 
binding. Institutions dedicated to protecting the welfare of human subjects may 
well make these changes without being prompted by a change in federal or state 
regulations; with the exception of the suggestion that institutions compensate 
injured participants (which has repeatedly been ignored), these ideas build on 
existing systems and do not require large resource outlays. The practical rewards 
of a functioning IDR system may be great, including reduced institutional 
exposure, improved community relations, and increased legitimacy of research at 
the institution. But most importantly, these adjustments to IDR processes for 
research-related harms are ethically warranted. The Belmont Report and other 
ethical guidelines have spoken widely on the need to minimizing subject harm, but 
have said little about how institutions can (and should) offer redress when they fail 
to do. Participants in human subjects research take on many burdens in the interests 
of scientific progress; when they experience unintended harms, they should not 
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bear the additional burden of unfair process. This Article is a start toward that goal. 
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